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Rebuilding the Closet: Bowers v. Hardwick, Lawrence v. Texas, and the
Mismeasure of Homosexual Historiography
Jody Madeira, MS., J.D.'
Introduction
By now, constitutional law and social science scholars cutting their teeth on legal
constructions of homosexuality have picked clean the bones of one of the hallowed texts of the
critical genre: Justice Blackmun's dissent in Bowers v. Hardwick.2 Blackmun's critique of the
majority's "almost obsessive focus on homosexual activity 3 ultimately leads him to echo the
words of Justice Holmes:
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid
down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds upon which
it was laid down have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from blind
imitation of the past.
4
In Bowers, Blackmun argued in vain, for even in its reviled state, the majority opinion in Bowers,
despite constant criticism, was for over a decade the word of law for defining a fundamental
right to engage in certain forms of sexual activity, and has increasingly provided the pattern for
defining fundamental rights to engage in activities entirely unrelated to sexuality.
Although Bowers itself has now been overruled and numerous historiographers have
noted the opinion's many inconsistencies and inaccuracies, continued state and federal
jurisprudential reliance upon its historical rationale in the context of determining whether or not
a plaintiff is asserting a cognizable fundamental right underscores the need for continuing redress
of such problems. It comes as no surprise that the 'homosexual' stigma that has allegedly
persevered from ancient Rome to post-industrial America offers a convenient, tradition-gilded
anchor to weigh down holdings against homosexual plaintiffs. However, the context of Bowers
has greatly expanded to reach issues far removed from its sexual orientation nexus. In essence,
the shabby arguments utilized by the majority in Bowers are constantly utilized to bolster
decisions regarding fundamental rights queries quite separate from issues of sodomy or even
sexual orientation.
Any competent jurist knows that, "[w]hile the Supreme Court frequently makes history
through its landmark decisions, it also often uses history to reach them." 5 Though the Court
rarely bungles history so badly, one can scarcely fault the Court for their misuse of history in
1 B.A., B.S., Millersville University of Pennsylvania 1997; M.S., Georgetown University 1999; J.D., University of
Pennsylvania Law School 2003; Ph.D. candidate, Annenberg School of Communication, University of
Pennsylvania.
2 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
3 Id. at 200.
4 Id. (Blackmun J., dissenting) (citing Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 469
(1897)).
5 Neil M. Richards, Clio and the Court: A Reassessment of the Supreme Court's Uses of History, 13 J.L. & POL. 809,
809 (1997).
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Bowers when so many other scholars and legal practitioners misuse or outright abuse historical
arguments. The frequency with which historical arguments are made demonstrates the need to
address whether historiography is an effective archaeological tool with which to assess legal
historical arguments. Using Bowers as an example, this paper will address the appropriateness of
historiographical arguments in the context of constructing homosexuality. Historical
inconsistencies and omissions, together with the truth that historical socio-cultural attitudes and
values are no longer part of our lived experience, fundamentally alter our conceptions of that
which has come before. This is particularly true in scholarly analyses addressing the historical
construction of homosexuality. Though it is perfectly possible (and always accurate) to point to
the first time that the term 'homosexuality' appeared in the English language, and its first use as
a referent for a person with a same-sex sexual orientation, it is not possible or even pertinent to
identify the true point at which homosexuality emerged, either as an urban subculture or as a
general societal awareness that sexual orientation was in fact a category by which to classify Self
and Other. The truth of these assertions will become readily apparent by the conclusion of this
analysis.
This paper acknowledges that "[i]t is now commonplace to disparage the Hardwick
Justices' performance as historians, though it is less common to specify what was wrong with
it.''6 In an effort to engage in such specification, this paper will first address mischaracterization
of history in Bowers, which portrays the historic legal and ecclesiastical penalties of what the
Court labels as "homosexual activities" as a continuous, unitary narrative extending from the
halls of the Emperors Theodosius and Justinian to the legislative assembly rooms of Georgia and
Texas. This illusory perspective portrays the criminalization of sodomy (and therefore the
identity of homosexuality itself) as an impossible cultural continuum. The impossibility of this
continuum lies not only in its implicit assumption that states and other lawmaking entities
throughout history shared the same cultural, moral, religious, and legal principles, but also in its
unqualified adoption of the secular state as the successor to religious authority and the seamless
secular synthesizing of penitential prohibitions against sexual sin into secular prohibition against
sexual crime. By summarizing the legal treatment of such allegedly homosexual behaviors from
the Roman Republic to modem America, this paper will not only demonstrate that the Bowers
conception of history as a continuum is in reality a series of discrete communal units, but will
also show that the confines of this continuum emphasize only the horizontal progression of time,
quashing significant differences in the authority of the entities who enact the laws and more
importantly in the laws themselves.
After summarizing and analyzing the scholarly criticism of historic Bowers blunders, this
paper will elaborate upon other broader difficulties with the Bowers decision-difficulties that
are characteristic of many homosexual historiographies. The first of these conundrums, the
erroneous assumption that sodomy statutes of past centuries were a former species of anti-
homosexual legislation, arises from the historic implications of the Court's conflation of
homosexual status with the act of sodomy. This conflation of homosexuality and sodomy is
particularly ironic as Michael Hardwick engaged in oral sex, or fellatio (not the anal sex that is
6 Janet E. Halley, Reasoning about Sodomy: Act and Identity in and After Bowers v. Hardwick, 79 VA. L. REV.
1721, 1751 (1997).
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typically defined as sodomy) which was not criminalized in any state until 1879. 7 The second
and third of these topics, the collapse of morality into legality and the subsequent collapse of the
legal into the social, also necessarily follow from the Court's collapse of status into act. Each of
these three conflated concepts-the collapse of sodomy criminal statutes with antihomosexual
legislation, morality with legality, and legal principles with social perspectives-will be
addressed in the context of the prior historical discussion of legislation prohibiting same-sex
activity from Republican Rome to modem America. The paper will then describe how Bowers
faulty historiography was not merely a series of uninformed generalizations but a conscious
strategy dictated by the Court's originalist platform that was developed to uphold the majority's
interpretation of Georgia's anti-sodomy statute. Finally, the paper will conclude by explicating
what impact the language of Lawrence v. Texas will have on future constructions of
homosexuality and its histories.
L Conceptions of Same-Sex Lovemaking and Sodomy Laws from Republican Rome to
Modern America
When in Rome...
For a Roman male, the "highest expression of virility" was to dominate other men, and so
the truly virile Roman male did not limit himself to women. 8 Besides the importance of being an
active partner, there was only one additional limitation on a Roman male's expression of
penetrative virility: a Roman male could not have relations with a free Roman youth, for the
Romans were concerned that submitting to another man by acting as the passive partner in same-
sex relations would undermine a youth's own developing virility. 9
Those who violated mores governing sexual relations with members of the same sex
violated the tenets of stuprum.I0 Same-sex violations of stuprum were not perceived as any more
or less shameful or egregious than those violations of stuprum that involved sexual relations
between men and women; "[s]tuprum was not defined with reference to the sex of a man's
partner."11 The offenses defined under stuprum included "illicit sexual relations in general,
including adultery and relations with a widow or an unmarried girl or boy of respectable
status."' 2 A consequence of violating sexual mores of Roman society was infamia, or the loss of
public honor.13 Infamia was "the opposite of existimatio, 'reputation,' and dignitas, 'social
standing,"' and an infamis had "as a consequence of moral turpitude, lost the status of a full
citizen." 1
4
7 William N. Eskridge, Jr., Hardwick and Historiography 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 631, 636.
8 EVA CANTERALLA, BISEXUALITY IN THE ANCIENT WORLD 98 (Cormac 6 Cuilleandin trans., 1992).
9 Id at 100.10 See generally, CRAIG A. WILLIAMS, ROMAN HOMOSEXUALITY: IDEOLOGIES OF MASCULINITY IN CLASSICAL
ANTIQUITY 97 (1999) (describing stuprum as a violation of the sexual integrity of freeborn Romans); JUDITH EVANS
GRUBBS, LAW AND FAMILY IN LATE ANTIQUITY: THE EMPEROR CONSTANTINE'S MARRIAGE LEGISLATION 95 (1995)
(describing stuprum as an offense whereby a married man's lover was an unmarried virgin or widow).
11 WILLIAMS, supra note 10, at 97.
12 GRUBBS,, supra note 10, at 95.13 See Catherine Edwards, Unspeakable Professions: Public Performance and Prostitution in Ancient Rome, in
ROMAN SEXUALITIES 66, 69 (Judith P. Hallett & Marilyn B. Skinner eds., 1997).
14 id.
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Roman males attempted to formalize same-sex unions by two methods: same-sex
"marriage" and collateral adoption. Marriages between men "were clearly practised only by a
minority of people, whose social status allowed them to provoke public opinion openly and
brazenly to exhibit their homosexuality."' 15 The second method, collateral adoption, may have
been more successful; however, there is only limited scholastic explication of the procedures by
which a Roman male could adopt his same-sex partner. Biographical references to actual
marriages celebrated by two people of the same sex are not found until the time of the Empire,
when Suetonius, Nero's biographer, described at least two same-sex marriage ceremonies in
which Nero acted as the bride (to a freedman) and the groom (to Sporus). 16 Elagabulus, Emperor
of Rome from 218 to 222, followed in Nero's marital footsteps and "flagrantly took a passive
role with other males," forming a long-term relationship with an athlete named Heirocles.
17
According to a source of that same time period, "at this time men who wished to advance in the
imperial court either had husbands or pretended they did.'
8
In the early years of the Republic, "there was no fixed procedure for penalizing acts of
stuprum" as all offenses were private violations under the paterfamilias' discretion.'9 Only the
act of seducing a free Roman carried legal consequences with any frequency.20  The legal
limitations on same-sex seductions of free Romans promulgated in the later Republic officially
defined and punished stuprum, taking it out of the family and replanting it in the public forum of
the courts.2 '
Without a doubt, the most significant legislation passed in the Republic delimiting and
punishing stuprum was the lex Scatinia.22 Unfortunately, the text of the law itself is lost to us,
but explicit references to this law are found in the writings of Cicero, Suetonius, Juvenal,
Ausonius, Tertullian, and Prudentius.23  Scholars estimate the passage of the lex Scatinia
occurred in approximately 149 BC.24 Some scholars hold that the lex Scatinia was in force at the
end of the Republican era.
25
Scholars also disagree over exactly which forms of same-sex activity the law penalized.
While some state that the lex Scatinia only punished stuprum cum puero, activity committed
with free-bom boys, others argue that it punished sex between adults, or that it only punished the
passive partner.26 It may also have rendered illicit the act of taking a passive role in sexual
15 CANTARELLA, supra note 8, at 176.
16 JOHN BOSWELL, SAME-SEX UNIONS IN PREMODERN EUROPE 80-81 (1994) (citing Suetonius, Nero 28). See also
Dio Cassius, Epitome 62.28 (referring to a marriage contract between Nero and Soprus, and public celebrations of
the marriage held by the Romans and the Greeks).
17 BOSWELL, supra note 16, at 84 (citing Dio Cassuis, 80[79].5, 14, 15, 16).
18 BOSWELL, supra note 16, at 85 (citing Lampridius 11).
19 WILLIAMS, supra note 10, at 119.
20 See id. at 99-100 (discussing Val. Max. 6.1.11, 6.1.10).
21 WILLIAMS, supra note 10, at 119-20.
22 WILLIAMS, supra note 10, at 120 (discussing penalties of Lex Scatinia).
21 CANTARELLA, supra note 8, at 106-07.24 Id. at 110 (citing Livy, P. Oxy. IV 668 col. V).
25 CANTARELLA, supra note 8, at 110-11.
261d. at 111.
S'ummer 2004
Richmond Journal of Law and the Public Interest
activity with another male in addition to penalizing stuprum cum puero.27 The punishment
inflicted under the lex Scatinia was a set fine of 10,000 sestertii.28 It does not appear that the lex
Scatinia was very effective; it did not seem to halt the seduction and love of free-born boys;
"[i]gnoring the law, men openly attempted to seduce boys, pestering them in the streets."
29
The final piece of legislation limiting sexual activity between males that was promulgated
during the Republic appears to be an edict passed by an urban praetor approximately thirty years
after the lex Scatinia entitled De adtemptata pudicitia.30 This edict attempted to "punish the
cruising lecher" who had not been deterred by the lex Scatinia.3 1  The edict established an
unknown penalty that would be imposed on "anybody who disturbed, on the public highway, not
only respectable women, but also praetextati [free-born boys]. 32 The De adtemptata pudicitia
illustrates that "the dichotomy between heterosexual and homosexual behaviour was beside the
point-the inpudicitia ofpueri was neither more nor less serious than that of women." 33
There has been much scholarly debate concerning the Lex Julia de adulteriis coercendis,
which was promulgated in 18 BC on a proposal from Augustus.34 As its name suggests, the Lex
Julia regulated stuprum most ostensibly in the form of adultery and it appears likely that "the two
laws ran side by side, neither interfering with the other, each regulating a different sector of
sexual life.",
35
Legislation concerning stuprum remained largely unaltered until the fourth century. 36 By
early Imperial Rome, "passive homosexuality" had become a "vice" that the imperial authority
felt obliged to combat through legislation.37 Christianity, which had matured from a persecuted
Roman cult into an official imperial religion, "introduced a new way of looking at sex, which
came from the Hebrew tradition," and which centered around the "principle of 'naturalness,'
which was exclusive to heterosexual intercourse." 38 Concerns other than religion also prompted
a tightening of legislation governing same-sex activity; as "pagan sexual morality was becoming
more restrictive in some circles in the first two centuries of the Empire," and "[t]he jurists whose
rulings criminalized some forms of homosexual behavior were all pagan."
39
A great number of the earliest regulations promulgated in the early Empire appear to be
limitations on male prostitution. Caligula supposedly banished male prostitutes from the city of
2 7 d.
28 Id. at 113. Cantarella discusses a passage from Quintilian's Institutio Oratoria, which describes a man who
committed "gross indecency on an ingenuus" who then hanged himself on account of shame; while the man was not
punished for the death of the ingenuus, he was sentenced to pay 10,000 sestertii, "the set penalty for sexual abusers."
Id. (discussing Quintil., Inst. Orat. IV, 2, 69).
29 COLIN SPENCER, HOMOSEXUALITY IN HISTORY 72 (1995).
30 CANTARELLA, supra note 8, at 115-16.
31 SPENCER, supra note 29, at 72; CANTARELLA, supra note 8, at 115.
32 CANTARELLA, supra note 8, at 114.
331Id. at 117.34 Id. at 142.35 Id. at 144.
36 Id. at 145.
37 Id. at 219.
38 Id. at 221.
39 DAVID GREENBERG, THE CONSTRUCTION OF HOMOSEXUALITY 232 (1988).
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Rome, and the emperor Alexander Severus taxed male prostitutes and used the proceeds to
restore various structures. Male prostitution was outlawed altogether by Marcus Julius
Philippus.4 1 These laws were tremendously ineffectual, as was another promulgated by Julius
Paulus, praetorian prefect under Alexander Severus, that stated that anyone who forced a slave to
submit to a "homosexual act" was guilty of corrupting the slave.
42
A praetororian edict forbidding passive homosexuals from representing others in legal
proceedings was reported by Ulpian early in the third century. 43 Men who had been "raped by
pirates or by the enemy in time of war" were not subject to this restriction, however, for it only
reached those who tried to play the "woman's role" in sexual activity with another man.44
In a constitution dated December 4, A.D. 342 issued from Milan, Constantius and
Constans issued a statement condemning the passive role in same-sex sexual activity. 45 On
August 6, A.D. 390, Theodosius I sent another constitution to Orientius, the vicar of the city of
Rome, the text of which is preserved in Romanarum et Mosaicarum legum Collatio.46 Cantarella
asserts that this law applies to those who played the passive role in same-sex relations. 47 In 438
the constitution of Theodosius the Great was inserted by Theodosius II in the Theodosian code in
a significantly amended form which mandated that all passive homosexuals were to be burned
alive; in 506, Alaric II, King of the Visigoths included this provision in the Breviarium
Alaricianum, "to regulate the relationships between Roman citizens living in his kingdom."
48
Until now, legislation affecting sexual relations between men had been in the same vein,
either punishing stuprum itself or punishing those who assumed the passive role in same-sex
intercourse. With Justinian, however, such legislation was radically altered. Justinian's
Institutions, published in 533, stated that "he who exercises his shameful lust with a man is
punished gladio on the basis of the Lex Julia," and established penalties for active participants in
same-sex relations for the first time.49 The promulgation of these new restrictions was most
likely the result of not only Justinian's commitment to Christian morality but also a sense of
superstition as well. In his Novella, published in 538 following a series of earthquakes and
plagues, Justinian implies that men who engaged in sexual activity with other men were to blame
for these tragedies.50
In the years following the publication of the Institutions, Justinian dedicated two more
constitutions to the topic of same-sex relations, confirming that the death penalty applied to all
40 CANTARELLA, supra note 8, at 173 (discussing Suet., Cal. 16; Hel., Lampr. Alex. Sev. 24 3-4).
CANTARELLA, supra note 8, at 173-74 (discussing Aur. Vict., De Caes 28.6).
42 GREENBERG, supra note 39, at 228.
43 CANTARELLA, supra note 8, at 173 (discussing Dig. 3.1.1.6).
44 WILLIAMS, supra note 10, at 125.
41 CANTARELLA, supra note 8, at 175, (citing Code Theod 9.7.3.
46 CANTARELLA, supra note 8, at 177, (citing Mos. Et Rom Legum. Coll., V, 3).
47 CANTARELLA, supra note 8, at 177.
48 Id. at 181, (discussing Brev. 1114, 5).
49 CANTARELLA, supra note 8, at 181 (citing Inst. 4.18.4).
50 Louis Crompton, What do you say to someone who claims that homosexuality caused the fall of Greece and
Rome?, reprinted in HOMOSEXUALITY IN THE ANCIENT WORLD 114 (Wayne R. Dynes & Stephen Donaldson eds.,
1992).
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participants regardless of what sexual role they played.51 The first of these constitutions, issued
in 538, dealt with "those who 'perform actions contrary to nature herself,"' and warned that
"those who commit these actions are ordered by the emperor to 'take into their souls the fear of
God and the judgment to come, and abstain from these devilish and illicit lusts'." 52 In 559,
Justinian issued the second of the constitutions that was "specifically addressed to those
committing sins of lust against nature." 53  It proclaimed, "we speak of outrages committed by
men, where they act most basely by abandoning themselves sinfully, men with men." 54 These
two constitutions illustrate that the legal conception of sexual activity between males has been
manipulated by Christian doctrine, that "[h]omosexuality has been transferred into the field of
crimes which offend the divinity," and that "[f]aw is now a weapon of the church., 55 A survey
of literary sources reveals that the punishment proscribed by Justinian was castration.
56
The Middle Ages
After the fall of Rome, the Roman legal legacy was inherited by Germanic tribes through
the Leges Barbororum; "[a]t first, the codes applied only to the German population in each
territory, while Roman law [applied to] the conquered Roman population." 57 Only later did they
become applicable to both. 58 Except for one provision, none of these codes mention same-sex
acts, and Greenberg asserts that "[t]he literary and historical sources suggest that . . . this is
because there was no prejudice against it."59 Only the law of Visigothic Spain under King
Chinaswinth in A.D. 650 mentioned such acts and prescribed castration for "those who lie with
males, or who consent to participate passively in such acts."
60
It appears as if rulers adopted edicts forbidding same-sex sexual activity according to the
strength of their religious convictions. Kings who assumed the role of church head for political
reasons also enforced church doctrine. Citing the Bible as his authority, King Egica, who
appointed his own bishops, deemed castration and execution the punishment for same-sex
activity. 6 1  More than a few of "Charlemagne's capitularies concerned sins against nature,
sodomy," and same-sex relations between monks but provided no penalties, simply ordering
violators to cease such relations.62  According to Greenberg, "[t]his comparative mildness
reflected the superficiality of the Gallic population's conversion to Christianity.
'
"
63
51 CANTARELLA, supra note 8, at 182.
52ld. at 182 (citing Nov. LXXVII, caput 1.1.1.2 pr.).
51 CANTARELLA, supra note 8, at 183.54 Id. at 183, (citing Nov. CXLI pr.).
55 CANTARELLA, supra note 8, at 183.56 Id. at 185.
57 GREENBERG, supra note 39, at 250.
58 GREENBERG, supra note 39, at 250.
59 id.
60 Id. (citing Lex Visigoth 3.5.4). "This secular penalty was to be followed by excommunication." GREENBERG,
supra note 39, at 250-51. After the Sixteenth Council of Toledo in 693, these penalties were strengthened by a
canon that called for degradation of clergy and exile, and lay men were to receive one hundred lashes as well. Id. at
251. King Egica supplemented this ecclesiastical provision with an edict mandating castration and execution. Id.
(citing Lex Visigoth 3.5.7).
61 See GREENBERG, supra note 39, at 251.
62 Id. at 253.
63 id.
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It fell to enterprising Christians who were unsatisfied with this state of affairs to take
"advantage of the poor quality of official record-keeping to forge royal documents advancing the
transformation of the realm into a corporate Christian kingdom." 64 Among these forged
documents are the False Capitularies of Benedict Levita authored between 847 and 852, in
which Benedict published capitularies from Frankish kings dating from 569 to 829; while many
of these are authentic, some are derived from Roman legal sources, Bavarian and Visigothic
customary law, and, of course, ecclesiastical texts.65 Predictably, three of these capitularies
mention same-sex relations; two warn that such activities endanger the continued existence of
kingdom and church but mention no penalty besides repentance and temporary excommunication
and a third proposes that sodomites be burned.66 Greenberg posits that these forgeries were
"attempts to create.., concern in what appears to be a largely indifferent population."
67
Aside from the law, there is evidence that aristocratic young males did engage in same-
sex relations. Medieval writers commonly associated male aristocracy with such activity,
including "Kings Edward II, William Rufus, and Richard the Lion-Hearted of England,
Frederick II of Germany, Philip II of France, and Conradin of Sicily; in addition, nobility such as
Robert, Duke of Normandy and brother to William Rufus, and William Atheling, son of Henry I
of England, were all linked with same-sex activity. 68 As the characteristics suggested by many
of these prominent names imply, this aristocracy was not necessarily "effete" but, as Greenberg
suggests, merely engaged in activity "consistent with the life of a warrior devoted to hand-to-
hand combat."69 Greenberg asserts that this condonation of same-sex activity explains the dearth
of legislation barring such acts until the mid-thirteenth century. 0
Ecclesiastical authorities, however, were all too eager to fill such gaps in secular law.
Penitentials, "manuals for confessors to be used as guides in the imposition of penances for
different sins," devote some space to same-sex conduct; most discuss only male same-sex
activity, and list separate provisions for different means of stimulation, with penalties being
assigned on the basis of ecclesiastical rank, age, whether the act was causal or habitual, and
whether the penitent's role was active or passive. 71  Penance ostensibly provided sinners
opportunity to "expiate their sin by mortifying the flesh, reflecting upon its gravity and resolving
not to commit it again." 72 In contrast to the secular code, which punished certain opposite-sex
sexual relations, penitentials are much more concerned with sexual relations, but "only a small
number of the sex-related canons deal with homosexual sins," a number that decreases in
vernacular penitentials. 73 Frantzen posits that there are three divisions of same-sex relations:
those between adult men and women, those "between boys or between a boy and a man," and
6 4
1d at 254.
6 51d. at 254.
66 id..
67 1d. at 255.
681d. at 259.
69 id.
70Id. at 260.
7 1 Id at 262.
72 JEFFREY RICHARDS, SEX, DISSIDENCE, AND DAMNATION: MINORITY GROUPS IN THE MIDDLE AGES 136 (1990).
73 ALLEN J. FRANTZEN, BEFORE THE CLOSET: SAME-SEX LOVE FROM BEOWULF TO ANGELS INAMERICA, 167-68
(1998).
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specific sex acts such as "mutual masturbation, fellatio, anal intercourse, and interfemoral
intercourse." 74 There are several penitentials whose prescribed punishments are still known;
these may be categorized as Latin penitentials and Anglo-Saxon penitentials; 75 Anglo-Saxon
penitentials deal with sexual behavior almost entirely in the context of marriage and adultery.
76
A great deal of discrepancy exists even within a single penitential as to which penance should be
levied for same-sex relations.
The Latin Penitential of Theodore, authored by the seventh-century Archbishop of
Canterbury, assigns a penance of ten years for frequent fornication with a male, fifteen years if
the offender is over twenty; another canon imposes ten years regardless of the sinner's age or
frequency and elsewhere imposes a seven-year penance for sodomites, while yet another passage
states that a man receives four years for the first offense and fifteen years for habitual acts, and
one year less if the act is not habitual.77 In Theodore's Penitential, three categories of male
offenders are distinguished--the sodomite, the masculus, and the mollis; while the masculus is "a
man who fornicates with another man ... the 'mollis' was associated with a woman" and the
sodomite was not, and so scholars have supposed that the mollis was the passive partner in same-
sex relations. 78 This penitential also advocated a twenty-day fast or beating for a boy who
engaged in interfemoral intercourse, and a one-year fast or three forty-day fasting periods for a
boy who had sex with a man.79 The Decretum of Burchard of Worms, dating from 1025,
imposed a penance of seven years fasting and abstinence for a single penitent who committed
sodomy once or twice and 10 years if the sinner was married, extended to 15 years if the offense
was habitual. 80 This penitential also differentiates between same-sex sodomy, which received
ten years penance for the first offense and twelve years for habitual offenses, and opposite-sex
sodomy, which received three years penance for adults and two years penance for boys.81 Other
same-sex acts received far lighter penances, with mutual masturbation earning thirty days and
interfemoral sex 40 days. The Penitential of Thorlac Thorhallson, the twelfth-century bishop of
Skalholt, Iceland, assigned a penance of nine to ten years for same-sex relations and bestiality. 82
The Penitential of Cummean, dating from the seventh century, assigned a penance of one year
for the first offense and two for repeat offenses in one paragraph, but elsewhere states that the
penance is two years for boys and three to four years for men.83 This penitential also has a
chapter on the "'sinful playing of boys,' which included kissing, masturbation, imitating acts of
fornication, bestiality, interfemoral intercourse, fellatio, anal intercourse, and heterosexual
intercourse," with assigned penances for each.84 Bede's Penitential assigns four years "penance
7 4
1d at 149
75 id
761d at 142.
7 7
1d at 151.
7 81Id at 152.
79 1d. at 159.
80 Richards, supra note 5, at 136-37.
81 Id. at 137.
82 GREENBERG, supra note 39, at 262.
83 id.
84 FRANTZEN, supra note 73, at 157. Kissing receives special fasts or harsh penances for those 20 years or older,
where the sinner lived on bread and water and was excluded from church. Id. Mutual masturbation between boys
20 years old received a 20 to 40 day penance, 100 days if repeated and one year if more frequently; interfemoral
intercourse earned 100 days for the first offense and one year upon repetition; sex between two boys earned the
younger boy a week's fast and a fast of a week and twenty days if he consented. Id.
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to the sodomite and seven years if the act is habitual or if the offender is a monk. 85 Egbert's
Penitential assigns seven years' penance to a sodomite, seven years for a habitual act, and three
years for men who fornicate anally.86 Egbert also refers to sodomy as a capital sin, but assigns
clergy different penances based on the sinner's ecclesiastical rank87 at the same time as stating
elsewhere that the penance for those in orders or habitual offenders is ten years, but sometimes
seven years for other offenders, one year for molles, and 100 days for boys.88  Egbert's
Penitential imposed one year's penance for the first offense of interfemoral intercourse and two
years for the second offense. 89  "The Old English Penitential draws penances from the
Penitential of Halitgar," assigning penances of fifteen years for males twenty or older and a
lifelong fast for a married man of forty.90 The Scriftboc required a boy forced into sex by an
older or larger boy to do seven days' penance, twenty if he consented, and advocated beating for
fornication between two boys.
91
Severe penances for same-sex relations are often matched by severe penances for sins
involving opposite-sex relations. The Penitential of Cummean assigns seven years' penance for
men who habitually engage in same-sex relations.92 Regino of Pim's book of ecclesiastical
discipline assigns three years' penance for anal intercourse with a person of either sex and three
years for opposite-sex fornication.93 The Book of David, dating from A.D. 500 to 525, states that
fornication with a woman "vowed to God or a husband" or with an animal or another male
should live "dead to the world., 94 The Penitential of Theodore assigns three years to a woman
who has same-sex relations and fifteen years for same-sex or opposite-sex fornicators.
95
While there are harsher penitentials that impose heavy penalties for same-sex sodomy,
Greenberg notes that it was not same-sex relations as a paradigm of activity that was being
punished but non-procreative sexual relations: "homosexuality was not the primary category for
distinguishing acceptable sex from unacceptable; the principal distinction had to do with the
potential for conception., 96 In addition, those assigned penance for same-sex relations did not
appear to lose communal status as a result of their behavior; "[e]ven where the penalties were
severe and the sin was regarded as grave, the penitent was still regarded as a member of the
community, not as an alien or monstrosity.... He was not 'a homosexual'-a distinct type of
person-but someone who engaged in a homosexual act." 97 However, the penitentials do reveal
that certain sinners did indeed have a sexual identity based on their involvement in same-sex
85 Id. at 153.
86 Id. at 153-54.
17 Bishops get fifteen years penance, priests twelve, deacons ten, subdeacons nine, clerics seven, and laypersons
five. Id. at 154.
88 Id. at 153-4.
89 Id. at 162.
90 Id. at 155.
9'Id. at 158.
92 GREENBERG, supra note 39, at 265.
93 id.
94 id.
95 id.
96 id.
97 Id. at 263.
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acts. Groups such as sodomites and molles also known as English baedlings, existed, and each of
these groupings comprised "a category of male persons known by their sexual practices."
98
In the thirteenth century the Church initiated an effort to reform the priesthood and
attacked same-sex relations among priests. In the twelfth century, such legislation had been
passed; in 1102, the Council of London passed ecclesiastical provisions stating that sodomitic
clergymen were to be deposed, and laymen were to be deprived of their "legal status and
dignity." 99  Saint Anselm, a twelfth-century Archbishop of Canterbury, urged that these
ecclesiastical penances for same-sex relations be moderated as "this sin has been so public that
hardly anyone has blushed for it."100 Pope Leo IX too had taken a quite forgiving stance toward
sinful clergy. 1 1 Such provisions grew more wicked teeth. As Richards notes, "a systematic and
coherent code of Church law emerged to replace the fragmentary and sometimes contradictory
set-up that had previously existed.' ' 2  The Fourth Lateran Council of 1215 established
Inquisition procedures under which moral offenses could be investigated and those found guilty
by church courts could be handed over to secular authorities for punishment. 10 3 Handbooks for
confessors known as Summae replaced the "sometimes contradictory and negotiable
penitentials."' 10 4 Gratian's Decretum incorporated Augustine's definitions of sexual sin and
distinguished between natural sins, such as fornication and adultery, and unnatural sins, such as
same-sex relations and bestiality. 10 5 Alain of Lille in Liber Poenitentialis (A.D. 1199-1202)
defined "sin against nature as expending one's seed outside the proper vessel., 10 6 Paul of
Hungary's work by the same name authored in 1220 considered "sin against nature as the
wasting of one's seed outside its normal vessel"; Paul attributed unnatural sin to overindulgence
in food, drink, and leisure. 10 7  Richards notes that this theory "gives the impression that
homosexuality was regarded not as something innate and inescapable but rather a habit
deliberately taken up as an act of defiance and wickedness."'10 8 The Council of Nablus in
Jerusalem in 1120 declared that the "persistent adult male sodomite was to be burned."' 10 9
Similarly, the Third Lateran Council of 1179 advocated deposition and penance for clerical
sodomites and excommunication for laymen.'1 10 These punishments were also adopted by the the
Council of Paris in 1212 and the Council of Rouen in 1214, enforced by the Lateran Council of
1215, and incorporated into the Liber Extra, papal decretals, for Pope Gregory IX in 1234.111 By
the late twelfth century, same-sex acts had been reserved to the bishop or his representative for
98 FRANTZEN, supra note 73, at 174.
99 1d. at 237.
100 GREENBERG, supra note 39, at 266.
101 St. Peter Damian and the Liber Gomorrhianus (A.D. 1048-1054) advocated barring clergy who had engaged in
same-sex relations from the priesthood, but Leo IX ruled that those guilty of solitary or mutual masturbation or
interfemoral intercourse could be readmitted to ecclesiastical rank if their sins had not been long-term or
promiscuous and if they completed penance and curbed desires. RICHARDS, supra note 72, at 139-40.
102 Id. at 139.
103 Id.
104 id..
105Id at 141.10 6 id.
107 id..
108 Id.
109 Id. at 142.
0Id. at 143.
111 Id.
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punishment. 1 2  In 1221, the Cistercians expelled convicted sodomites from the order, and,
together with the Dominican and Carthusian orders constructed prisons to house criminals,
including sodomites. 113 Pope Gregory IX's 1233 papal bull Vox in Raoma linked same-sex
activity to heresy and witchcraft.14
The thirteenth century also marked the rebirth of secular prohibitions against same-sex
relations, as many secular governments enacted laws prohibiting 'crimes against nature' and
ecclesiastical provisions were more strictly enforced. 1 5 The reasons for this change are not
clear, but Eskridge asserts that
It can be said that more punitive attitudes coincided with the quickening of a
culture in the West that was urban, bourgeois, and statist.... [This] culture created
more occasions for people to find, pursue, and enjoy same-sex partners.
Increasing economic opportunities ... gave substantial numbers of men more
freedom to choose and diversify the nature of their sexual liaisons."
116
As a result, same-sex relations became more prominent and wide-spread and political powers
repressed those who did not conform. 117 Richards posits that the impetus for the animus towards
same-sex relations was the rediscovery of Roman law, which laid the foundation for "a moral
role for monarchical law-makers" who, following Justinian, would proscribe harsh
punishments. 118 Edward I of England and Louis IX of France ruled that those engaging in same-
sex relations would be burned, and Alfonso X of Castile preferred that the punishment would be
"castration followed by hanging by the legs until dead." 119  The fifteenth-century Spanish
sovereigns Ferdinand and Isabella preferred burning. 120 Such laws were enforced, perhaps from
political rather than moral rationales-in 1307, Philip IV of France arrested the Knights Templar
and charged them with engaging in same-sex relations on demand; 36 died under torture and
another 72 were burned.
121
Cities and towns, following the "puritanical and moralistic influence of the Mendicant
Orders, moved to suppress homosexuality" and declared that habitual sodomites be put to death
by burning or beheading, although infrequent and underage offenders received lesser
penalties. 122 Siena appointed men to hunt sodomites, and by the mid-thirteenth century, the
Inquisition was established and "lay confraternities associated with Mendicant orders became a
112 id.
113 Id..
114 id.
115 WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: FROM SEXUAL LIBERTY TO CIVILIZED
COMMITMENT 35 (1990).
116Id. at 36.
117 id.
118 RICHARDS, supra note 72, at 143.119 Id. at 143-44.
12 0 d at 144.
121 Id.
122 Id. at 145. Such towns included Ancona, Bellunoa, Bologna, Cremona, Faenza, Florence, Lucca, Modena,
Orvieto, Parma, Perugia, Reggio Emilia, Siena, Spoleto, Todi, Urbino. Id. Perugia fined for the first two offenses
and burned third-time offenders, Todi fined offenders under 33 and burned those over 33, and Florence fined and
beat offenders under 16. Id.
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means of persecuting heretics and sodomites.' '123 Cities set up special offices to eradicate this
vice. In 1415, the Florentine Office of Decorum was established to police public morals and set
up municipal brothels to "wean young Florentine males away from sodomitic practices"; in
1432, the Office of the Night was set up to suppress sodomy and institute a fine scale of 50 to
500 florins for the first four sodomy offenses and a punishment of burning for the fifth.124 Other
cities, such as Venice, commissioned certain citizens to report activity.
125
In summary, attitudes toward same-sex activity changed dramatically from the early to
the late Middle Ages. Richards asserts that "what changed.., was not a move from tolerance to
intolerance for reasons not intrinsic to Christian belief but an alteration in the means of dealing
with it," with punishments changing from penance to burning. 126 Richards further emphasizes
that "there was never any question of homosexuals being allowed to carry on with homosexual
activity unpunished. They were obliged to give it up or risk damnation."'127 It is important to
realize, however, that just because such laws were on the books does not mean that they were
enforced with any regularity. As Norton comments, "[i]t is not really true to say, for example,
that in thirteenth-century France sodomites had their testicles amputated on the first offence,
their penis amputated on the second, and were burned for a third offence.., because no one was
prosecuted under this law."'128 Thus, Norton asserts, "medieval prosecutions were exceedingly
rare, though there are exceptional cases."
129
The Renaissance
As is evident from the European legal currents in the late Middle Ages, "Western
society's obsession with certain categories of people became more pronounced," with "isolated
persecutions of individuals engaging in sinful conduct" giving way to "hysterical persecutory
crazes that swept up throngs of people (heretics, witches, sodomites) in popular, ecclesiastical,
and official dragnets.' 130  Beginning in the fifteenth century, there is some history of
prosecutions but the laws were still not applied consistently or vigorously and cases are
sporadic.13 '
123 Id.
124Id at 145-46.
125 Id. at 147. The Vicar-General of Venice mandated lifetime imprisonment on bread and water for Augustinian
sodomites, and defined sodomy as exclusively same-sex. Id. A 1467 provision mandated that doctors, barbers, and
healers report anal injuries. Id. In the 1450s a sodomy census was taken with two nobles per parish assigned for
one year to investigate sodomy in their jurisdictions. Id. at 148.
126Id. at 149.
127 id.
128 RICTOR NORTON, THE MYTH OF THE MODERN HOMOSEXUAL: QUEER HISTORY AND THE SEARCH FOR CULTURAL
UNITY 137 (1997).129 Id. Norton reports that there were fifty prosecutions in Florence from the mid-fourteenth century to the mid-
fifteenth century and the death sentence was imposed in twelve cases. Id.
130 ESKRIDGE, supra note 115, at 36.
131 NORTON, supra note 128, at 137. Norton remarks that Spanish prosecutions varied from city to city, with 52
executions for sodomy in Seville, 17 in Valencia, 34 in Zaragoza, and 2 in Barcelona from the late sixteenth century
to the early seventeenth century. Id. at 138. During the same time period, France saw 121 appeals from death
sentences for sodomy; in 1533, two women were acquitted of tribadism; in the sixteenth century, several females
were burned for dressing as men and marrying women; in 1691, a sodomite was confined to the General Hospital;
and in 1750, two lovers were burned. Id. In Geneva, during a 120-year period from the mid-sixteenth century on,
there were 62 prosecutions and 30 executions for sodomy; in Ghent and Bruges, 24 monks were burned to death in
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In England, the death penalty for sodomy, referred to as "buggery," was instituted in
1533 under Henry VIII (and reenacted in 1562 under Elizabeth I); "the law was directed against
a series of sexual acts, not a particular type of person."'132 The first prosecution came in 1540
and the second one year later in 1541, but the third did not arrive until 1631.133 Apparently,
these early sodomy trials did not prosecute men for sodomy alone but also for other offenses
such as religious heresy, political offences, violations of class distinction, or violence.
134
Therefore, there was little "hard and fast evidence of widespread abhorrence of homosexuality
during the reigns of James I and Charles I" as "one execution is hardly enough to terrify three or
four generations of potential queers."'
135
Pre-Industrial and Industrial Europe
Increased scrutiny of sexual practices continued into the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries. Faced with such scrutiny, those attracted to others of the same sex "gravitated to
underground communities inhabited by like-feeling residents, namely, subcultures of inverts in
urban areas such as London; Paris; most major Dutch cities, including Amsterdam; most major
Italian cities, including Venice; and elsewhere by the early eighteenth century."
136
Enlightenment Europe had been characterized by an insurgence of intellectual interest in
Socratic love and classical heritage, and some scholars have posited that intellectuals of the time
used these philosophical mediums to promote a kind of homoeroticism concerning "male
eros." 137 This concept of male eros did not involve sodomy, being more a love celebrated by the
mind than a love celebrated by the body. This movement uplifted male eros and condemned
sodomy, favoring not harsh punishment but prevention. 138  Gerard posits that it was this
Enlightenment movement which "put an end to the criminal laws condemning sodomy in large
parts of the Western world."'139 Whatever the impetus for repeal, the "supposed increase in
intolerance during the rise of market capitalism ... is refuted by an actual decrease in the severity
of the laws.' 140 The French Penal Code of 1791 decriminalized homosexual acts, and Russia,
Austria, and Tuscany repealed the death penalty for homosexuality in the late eighteenth century;
at the same time, penalties were reduced in all Latin American countries, with Brazil
decriminalizing homosexuality in 1830.141
the sixteenth century and three men in the seventeenth century. Id. In Leiden, two women were flogged and
banished for "lesbianism" before 1700. Id.
132 Robert Padgug, Sexual Matters: Rethinking Sexuality In History, in HIDDEN FROM HISTORY: RECLAIMING THE
GAY AND LESBIAN PAST 54, 59 (Martin Bauml Duberman, Martha Vicinus, & George Chauncey, Jr. eds., 1989).
See 25 Hen. ch. 6 (1533), 5 Eliz. 17 (1562).
133 NORTON, supra note 128, at 139.
134 Id
135 Id
136 ESKRIDGE, supra note 115, at 42.
137Gert Hekma, Sodomites, Platonic Lovers, Contrary Lovers: The Backgrounds of the Modern Homosexual, in
THE PURSUIT OF SODOMY: MALE HOMOSEXUALITY IN RENAISSANCE AND ENLIGHTENMENT EUROPE 436 (Kent
Gerard & Gert Hekma eds., 1989).
138 See id. at 444.
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Though some scholars contend that Britain decreased its penalties for same-sex acts "as
imperialism advanced," the majority disagree. 142  Laws against same-sex relations in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, "though narrowly defined the punished acts (sodomy in the
sense of anal intercourse, punishable severely, often by death), were broadly applied (sodomy as
anything other than provable anal intercourse, punishable by a fine, the pillory and two years'
imprisonment).' 43  In 1861, the Offences Against the Person Act, amended in 1885 by the
Labouch6re Amendment, recodified the same-sex acts criminalized as felonies or misdemeanors
since 1533.44 Before 1885, Norton reports that most men prosecuted were convicted of
"attempted sodomy," a misdemeanor involving oral intercourse, mutual masturbation, frottage,
groping, and soliciting. 145 The Labouch6re Amendment used the term 'gross indecency' instead
of 'attempted sodomy' to refer to such acts, 146 and deemed such acts committed between two
men in public or in private misdemeanors to be punishable by "up to two years of hard labor."'
147
Norton asserts that the Amendment "had no effect.., upon queers' own conception of what was
legal or illegal," and "it has not been established that prosecutions increased because of this
amendment."
148
The public perception of sodomites also changed during this time period. Trumbach
suggests that between 1100 and 1700 "effeminacy had been ... characteristic of both the man
who sexually cared too much for women, as well as of the male who took the passive role in
sexual intercourse," while "sodomy had been an act of which all men were capable."'
149
Increasingly, however, sodomites were seen as not merely passive but effeminate as well.
150
Colonial America
Obviously, the Europeans who emigrated from England in the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries departed the mother land's shores while Henry VIII's 1533 sodomy law was still in
effect. Colonial legal codes incorporated this statute and often referred to the Bible as well,
assigning death as the appropriate punishment for sodomy. 151 Statutory provisions in Plymouth,
Massachusetts, Connecticut, and New Hampshire all cited a passage from Leviticus, while a
Rhode Island law followed the Book of Romans in defining sodomy. 152 Jamestown (in 1610) 153
142Id. at 140-41.
143 Id. at 141.
144 Id.
145 Id.
146 id.
147Id. at 199.
148 Id. at 141.
149 Randolph Trumbach, Sodomitical Assaults, Gender Role, and Sexual Development in Eighteenth-Century
London, in THE PURSUIT OF SODOMY: MALE HOMOSEXUALITY IN RENAISSANCE AND ENLIGHTENMENT EUROPE 407,
408 (Kent Gerard & Gert Hekma eds., 1989).150 id.
151 JOHN D'EMILIO, SEXUAL POLITICS, SEXUAL COMMUNITIES: THE MAKING OF HOMOSEXUAL MINORITY IN THE
UNITED STATES 1940-1970, at 14 (1983).152 LEILA J. RuPP, A DESIRED PAST: A SHORT HISTORY OF SAME-SEX LOVE IN AMERICA 28 (1999). The Leviticus
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and the other southern colonies adopted the English "buggery" statute. 154 Some New England
colonies expanded upon the 1533 Act; the Massachusetts Bay colony debated and ultimately
rejected the Reverend John Cotton's proposal in 1636 that "intercourse" between two women be
classified as sodomy, but in 1656 the New Haven colony prohibited same-sex acts, including
intercourse, masturbation, and other carnal knowledge. 155 Eskridge reports that there were
twenty prosecutions and four executions for sodomy during the colonial period.156 Rupp more
specifically states that from 1607 to 1740 there were nineteen cases where sodomy was charged
and five executions. 157 Norton, on the other hand, states that an 1861 sodomy conviction was the
first for almost 200 years. 158 All-in-all, by 1830, all of the original 13 states had enacted
legislation criminalizing sodomy, but most eliminated the death penalty as a possible
punishment. 159 Thomas Jefferson authored a 1779 Virginia provision mandating castration as
the punishment for all men convicted of rape, sodomy, bestiality, or polygamy. 160 Magistrates
also used lewd-behavior provisions for prosecuting those who engaged in same-sex activity. 161
Colonists did engage in same-sex activity, for "criminal records, church sermons, and
other evidence" testify to the presence of same-sex "homoerotic activity," but "[s]ame-sex erotic
behavior remained sporadic and exceptional."' 162 Opposite-sex relations dominated sexuality,
and "the imperative to procreate dominated the social attitude toward and organization of
sexuality" so that "the existence of lesbians and gay men was inconceivable."' 163 As D'Emilio
notes, "[e]ven the trials of persistent offenders document daily lives that revolved around a
heterosexual family role," and colonists did not conceive of same-sex acts as different from other
prohibited sexual activities that "occurred outside the sanctioned bonding of husband and
wife.' 164 Rupp concludes, from "the minimal evidence we do have," that "ordinary people...
did not always harshly judge people accused of same-sex sexuality."'165
Industrial and Post-Industrial America
During the latter half of the nineteenth century, a momentous economic shift occurred,
and industrial capitalism relocated people from the home-based economy to the marketplace.
166
D'Emilio suggests that this enabled the modem concept of homosexual identity to emerge. 167
The prosecution of same-sex behavior took on moral overtones once again when it was identified
affection, whereby men given up thereto to leave the natural use of woman and bum in their lusts one toward
another, and so men with men work that which is unseemly." Id.153 D MICHAEL QUINN, SAME-SEX DYNAMICS AMONG NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICANS 34 (1996).
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with vice in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In post-Civil War America, purity
movements emerged to reinforce traditional gender roles and fight prostitution;168 these social
movements influenced municipal, state, and national policy between 1881 and 1921.169 The
New York Penal Code of 1881 "exemplified post-Civil War state morals codes," and prohibited
sodomy along with rape, abduction, abortion, and bigamy.1
70
Those involved in purity movements soon found out that sodomy statutes were not the
best means by which to suppress sexual deviance because invoking the criminal system invoked
by proxy important rights for the defendant, including a requirement that a person could not be
convicted for sodomy based upon a "willing adult accomplice's testimony."'171 To remedy this,
states such as Pennsylvania enacted new sodomy statutes which were "taken to cover and
include" acts where one person has carnal knowledge of another, including oral sex; New York
passed a similar law in 1886, as did Ohio in 1889, Louisiana in 1896, Wisconsin in 1898, Iowa in
1902, Washington in 1909, Missouri in 1911, Virginia in 1916, and Minnesota in 1921.172 In
1923, New York passed a law forbidding homosexual "lewdness," including cruising, and
fortified existing public solicitation laws. 173 States either followed the English approach of
creating a separate crime for oral sex, often phrased as 'gross indecency' as in Michigan (1903);
'lewd and lascivious acts' as the laws of Massachusetts (1887), Maryland (1916), and Florida
(1917) termed it; 'private lewdness' as was found in New Jersey (1906); 'crimes against nature'
as in Illinois (1897), and Georgia (1904); or the forthright 'oral copulation' found in California
(1915, 1921).174 Despite these broader phrasings of same-sex activity, most arrests continued to
occur under municipal provisions such as "public lewdness, indecency, vagrancy, disorderly
conduct, and solicitation," which granted the defendant far fewer procedural protections. 1
75
Eskridge asserts that no statutes focused on "consensual erotic activities between people
of the same sex" and that sodomy laws were only rarely applied to adults who engaged in
consensual same-sex activity. 176 By 1881, 36 out of 39 states had criminalized sodomy or the
"crime against nature;" however, in 1880 only 63 prisoners were in American jails for
committing such crimes. 177 Eskridge characterizes social and legal attitudes of that time period
toward same-sex activity by stating that while "society gave same-sex intimacy no sanction,
neither did it impose legal penalties.' 178  This changed by 1890, when 224 people were
incarcerated for crimes against nature; New York City, which had prosecuted 22 sodomy cases
from 1796 to 1873, was arresting as many men annually by 1890, and prosecutions were up in
Philadelphia, Boston, and Chicago by 1900, with those in Baltimore, St. Louis, Cleveland, Los
Angeles, and San Francisco making arrests in the double digits from 1911 to 1920, when
168 ESKRIDGE, supra note 155, at 19.
169 Id. at 24.
17°Id at 19.
171 Id. at 24.
172 Id. at 24-25.
173 JENNIFER TERRY, AN AMERICAN OBSESSION: SCIENCE, MEDICINE, AND HOMOSEXUALITY IN MODERN SOCIETY
270 (1999).
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Richmond and Nashville recorded their first sodomy arrests.179 Quite obviously, arrests for
sodomy comprised but a tiny fraction, which Eskridge estimates to be one percent, of all
arrests. 
180
In the early twentieth century, homosexuality, or inversion, was acquiring the overtones
of mental illness, and mental illness itself was acquiring a criminal aura; several states passed
laws in the 1920s that were based on "psychopathic theories of disease," such as Massachusetts'
Briggs Law of 1921, which required psychiatric evaluation of "recidivist felons and those
convicted of capital offenses.' 181 Laws passed in the late 1930s in states such as California,
Ohio, Minnesota, Michigan, and Illinois specified "sexual psychopathology" as a criminal
motive. 182 New York law mandated that the accused in a criminal case be screened, and further
required that those convicted of a felony undergo psychiatric evaluation at Bellevue Hospital to
assist the judge in determining an appropriate sentence. 183 Such laws were enacted in the hopes
that people could be deterred from homosexuality. 184 Prosecutions grew more aggressive; from
1936 to 1940, sodomy arrests increased in Baltimore, Cleveland, Washington, D.C., Miami, New
York, and St. Louis, and from 1936 to 1937 incarcerations for "predatory" offenses such as
"rape, statutory rape, indecent liberties, and sodomy" rose from 9.8 percent to 14.9 percent. 185
Post-World War II years ushered in increased anxiety against sexual psychopaths; in
Washington, D.C., (where Congress enacted the Miller Act of 1948, which doubled the
maximum penalty for child molestation from 10 to 20 years), California (which raised maximum
penalties in 1952 for oral sex with minor and sodomy to life in prison), Illinois (which increased
penalties in 1945 for indecent liberties with minors), and New York (which made consensual
adult sodomy a misdemeanor in 1950 but raised the sentence for forceful sodomy or sodomy
with a minor) all revised laws to impose harsher penalties on those engaging in sodomy or other
same-sex conduct. 186  Those convicted under sexual psychopath laws, who were often
homosexuals, were sent to hospitals like California's Atascadero State Hospital, where they were
subjected to lobotomies, shock therapy, and sterilization. 187 Private, as well as public, same-sex
behaviors were eventually criminalized, as in 1953 in Washington, D.C., and by 1961, 21 states
had followed suit.
188
As Eskridge notes, in contrast to 'inverts' in the 1880s, who were not particularly
targeted by criminal laws, by World War II,
A homosexual with an active social life had a good chance of spending time in
jail, possibly for sodomy but most likely for misdemeanors such as disorderly
conduct, lewd vagrancy, indecent exposure, lewd or lascivious conduct, indecent
179 Id. at 25.
180 id.
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liberties with minors, loitering near a public toilet or schoolyard, or sexual
solicitation.
189
This surveillance of sexual activity of course had profound consequences for the homosexual
community, encouraging homosexuals to keep their sexual attractions secret. Eskridge notes that
in the 1930s and 40s homosexuals spoke of "wearing the mask" or "masquerade" to refer to the
visibility of their sexual orientation. 190 After World War II, however, the more restrictive closet
metaphor soon replaced the mask metaphor. 
191
The closet has slowly become less necessary over the years since 1981 as increasing
numbers of states and cities have enacted laws protecting homosexual people against
discrimination and violence. 192 Courts are increasingly likely to normalize homosexuality by
recognizing domestic partnerships and second-parent adoptions by same-sex parents.
193
II. Bowers' Powers: The Case and the Criticism it Inspired
Of course, one can scarcely conclude any history of same-sex activity regulation,
however brief, without mentioning the infamous Bowers v. Hardwick.194 In Bowers, Justice
White considered a Georgia anti-sodomy statute, similar to the anti-sodomy laws of "the many
States that still make such conduct illegal and have done so for a very long time." 195 It is legal
legend by now that White, writing for the majority, states that there was no fundamental right to
engage in homosexual sodomy, in part because "[p]roscriptions against that conduct have ancient
roots., 196 These "ancient roots," extended to the American shores, are linked to the fact that
"[s]odomy was a criminal offense at common law and was forbidden by the laws of the original
13 States when they ratified the Bill of Rights," and that, when the Fourteenth Amendment was
ratified in 1868 "all but 5 of the 37 Stated in the Union had criminal sodomy laws."'197 White
also noted that "until 1961, all 50 States outlawed sodomy," and at the time of the opinion, "24
States and the District of Columbia continue to provide criminal penalties for sodomy performed
in private and between consenting adults."'
198
In his concurrence, Justice Burger echoes the historical criminalization of sodomy and
bolsters White's historical analysis, stating that "[d]ecisions of individuals relating to
homosexual conduct have been subject to state intervention throughout the history of Western
civilization," and that such prohibitions are "firmly rooted in Judeao-Christian moral and ethical
standards."' 199 Burger states not only that homosexual sodomy was "a capital crime under
Roman law," but also notes that "[d]uring the English Reformation when powers of the
189 Id. at 43.
190Id. at 55.
191 Id.
192,id at 139.
193 Id.
194 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
195 478 U.S. at 190.
196 Id. at 192.
197 Id. at 192-93.
198 Id. at 193-94.
199 Id. at 196 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
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ecclesiastical courts were transferred to the King's Courts, the first English statute criminalizing
sodomy was passed., 200 Burger then remarks that "[t]he common law of England, including its
prohibition of sodomy, became the received law of Georgia and the other Colonies," a legal
connection that explains the Georgia Legislature's 1816 passage of the statute under analysis that
"has been continuously in force in one form or another since that time."201 Burger concludes
with the famous assertion that "[t]o hold that the act of homosexual sodomy is somehow
protected as a fundamental right would be to cast aside millennia of moral teaching."
20 2
The historical assertions of Justices White and Burger did not go unchecked, however. In
his dissent, Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, state that the
"invocation" of Judeo-Christian tradition could not support the Georgia statute at issue:
"petitioner's invocation of Leviticus, Romans, St. Thomas Aquinas, and sodomy's heretical
status during the Middle Ages undermines his suggestion that § 16-6-2 represents a legitimate
use of the state's secular coercive power."20 3 Blackmun further remarks that the "theological
nature" of "Anglo-American antisodomy statutes is patent" as sodomy was not a secular offense
in England until 1533, having been "in Sir James Stephen's words, 'merely ecclesiastical.' 20 4
In regards to the transformation of sodomy from an ecclesiastical sin into a criminal offense,
Blackmun notes that "the transfer of jurisdiction over prosecutions for sodomy to the secular
courts seems primarily due to the alteration of ecclesiastical jurisdiction attendant on England's
break with the Roman Catholic Church, rather than to any new understanding of the sovereign's
interest in preventing or punishing the behavior involved., 20 5 Justice Stevens also equates the
criminalization of heterosexual sodomy with that of homosexual sodomy, stating that "it is the
indiscriminate prohibition of sodomy, heterosexual as well as homosexual, that has been present
'for a very long time.'
20 6
Bowers has left a profound legacy, extending far beyond the boundaries of homosexual
sodomy and even homoerotic sexuality. Of course, numerous courts have copied Bowers'
historical analysis in cases involving criminalized sodomy or homosexual identity.20 7 Numerous
courts, in opinions addressing issues such as the discipline or termination of an employee for
208 siie 209  as210adultery, assisted suicide, nonobscene nude dancing as expression, and a zoning
2°°Id. at 196-97.
201 Id. at 197.
202 id.
203 Id. at 211 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
204 Id. at 212 n. 6 (quoting 2 J. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIM[NAL LAW OF ENGLAND 429-30 (1883)).
205 Id.
206 Id. at 215 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
207 See Able v. United States, 968 F. Supp. 850 (E.D.N.Y. 1997), rev'd, 155 F.3d 628 (1998); Christensen v. State,
468 S.E.2d 188 (Ga. 1996); Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d 18 (Ga. 1988); State v. Smith, 766 So. 2d 501 (La. 2000);
Lawrence v. State, 41 S.W.3d 349 (Tex. App. 2001), rev'd, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003); Santillo v. Commonwealth, 517
S.E.2d 733 (Va. App. 1999); United States v. Hall, 34 M.J. 695 (A.C.M.R. 1991).
208 See Mercure v. Van Buren Tp., 81 F. Supp. 2d 814 (E.D. Mich. 2000) (holding that the discharge of a police
officer after an affair with the estranged wife of another office was not a violation of his free association and privacy
rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments); Oliverson v. West Valley City, 875 F. Supp. 1465 (D.Utah
1995).209 See Kevorkian v. Thompson, 947 F. Supp. 1152 (E.D. Mich, 1997); Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir. 1996),
rev'd, 521 U.S. 793 (1997); Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996), rev'd, 521
U.S. 702 (1997).
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ordinance restricting locations of sexually-oriented businesses 211 have referred to the Bowers
holding. Still other cases have not cited Bowers but have greatly mimicked the majority's
superficial historical analysis in addressing unrelated legal issues such as child custody
21221disputes. Only a few courts have rejected Bowers' historical analysis as troublesome.213
Bowers' rather flimsy analysis of history has of course engendered much criticism. Most
of these criticisms make use of a Foucaltian analysis, contending that homosexuality did not
exist until the eighteenth century and thus Justices White and Burger failed to capture the recent
construction of homosexuality as a viable social category. Other scholars struggle to make a
case that same-sex relations, while legally prohibited, were socially celebrated in various
historical venues from Rome to the World War II era.
Anne B. Goldstein's 1988 analysis of Bowers' historical errors faults Justices White and
Burger for not realizing that "'homosexuality' lacks an unambiguous, uncontroversial, meaning"
and claiming that "historical conceptions of 'homosexual sodomy' . . . informed the framers'
vision of the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment." 214  Contending that Bowers'
historical analysis is insufficiently "accurate to guide constitutional interpretation," Goldstein
argues that the majority's reference to 'ancient roots' "oversimplifies and distorts a complex
historical record" and "misuses the relatively modem concept of 'homosexuality' to depict the
past., 215 Goldstein states that, instead, homosexuality is a "cultural and historical artifact," not a
conception that lies "outside of history," and further states that "[n]o attitude toward
'homosexuals' or 'homosexuality' can really be identified before the mid-nineteenth century
because the concept did not exist until then" as "[b]efore the late 1800s, sexuality . . . was
something a person did, not what he or she was." 216 Thus, Goldstein explicates how "White and
Burger were inserting their modern understanding of 'homosexuality' anachronistically into
systems of values organized on other principles, obscuring the relative novelty of the distinction
between 'homosexuality' and 'heterosexuality' with a myth about its antiquity." 217 Focusing
more specifically on the "act/identity problem" in Bowers' history, Janet Halley echoes
Goldstein's criticism in her statement that "[t]o claim that present sodomy statutes prohibit the
same thing as ancient sodomy prohibitions and as the colonial proscriptions which Justice White
so lovingly cited, is to promote formal sameness over radical historical discontinuity."218 Halley
asserts that this leads to a submergence of all discontinuity which acts as the "basis for [the
Court's] fundamental rights holding, a uniform history of sodomy throughout Western
210 See Miller v. City of South Bend, 904 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1990) (challenging the constitutionality of Indiana's
public indecency statute, the Seventh Circuit overruled the district court and found that non-obscene nude dancing
performed as entertainment was expression and thus entitled to a protection under the First Amendment which made
the statute's total ban on nudity unconstitutional), rev'd, 501 U.S. 560 (1991).
211 See Dumas v. City of Dallas, 648 F. Supp. 1061 (N.D. Tex. 1986) (upholding constitutionality of zoning
ordinances which regulated sexually-oriented businesses with four minor severable exceptions).
212 See Ex Parte H.H., 830 So. 2d 21, 28-35 (Ala. 2002).
213 See Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992) (affirming that state homosexual sodomy statute was
unconstitutional because it violated the privacy and equal protection of the Kentucky Constitution).214 Anne B. Goldstein, History, Homosexuality, and Political Values: Searching for the Hidden Determinants of
Bowers v. Hardwick, 97 YALE L.J. 1073, 1079-80 (1988).
2 15 Id. at 1081, 1086.
216 Id. at 1087.
217 Id. at 1088-89.
218 Halley, supra note 6, at 1752.
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history. ' 219 Finally, in more recent critical charges, Eskridge contends that Justice White's
historical commentary ignores the "normative regime of sodomy laws," 220 that White places
homosexuality at the mid-nineteenth century ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment when
none knew what that condition meant,221  and that Justice White poses a twentieth-century
conceptualization of the homosexual as an ancient entity.
222
219Id at 1755.
220 See ESKRIDGE, supra note 155, at 161. Here Eskridge notes that
White's ahistorical misreading of the prohibitory regime of sodomy laws helped obscure a
deeper problem with his analysis, namely, his ahistorical misreading of the normative regime of
sodomy laws. Sodomy laws have at different points in time reflected no fewer than three
different normalizing regimes: sexual acts must be procreative and marital, must be mutual and
consensual, and/or must be gendered or heterosexual. Focusing only on the third option, White
imposed his own normalizing regime and ignored the norms that would have justified sodomy
regulation in 1868 and before.
As Burger's concurring opinion appreciated, the primary historical justification for
penalizing sodomy was the Judeo-Christian valorization of sex within the context of procreative
marriage.... When American states codified their criminal laws in the middle third of the
nineteenth century, most of them followed this Judeo-Christian tradition and included sodomy
prohibitions in close proximity with abortion, fornication, adultery, and incest ..... Although
the framers of the fourteenth amendment would have rationalized sodomy laws as requiring that
sex occur within procreative marriage, White ignored this rationale because it was foreclosed by
the Court's precedents.
Id.
221 See id. at 163. Eskridge states that
White faulted Hardwick for engaging in "homosexual" sodomy. Hardwick's rationalization
for sodomy laws, compulsory heterosexuality, would have been literally incomprehensible to
the framers of the fourteenth amendment, who would not have recognized the word
"homosexual" or "heterosexual".... One would read the pre-1900 cases in vain to find any
mention of homosexuality, a condition that did not even exist. To be sure, nineteenth-century
America was appalled that a man would be anally penetrated, but it was appalled because that
penetration was sinfully nonprocreative, was probably without meaningful consent, and
violated the gender role of the victim.
Id.
222 See id. As Eskridge notes,
Byron White's choice of a normalizing regime for sodomy laws had nothing to do with the
expectations of the nineteenth-century legislatures that adopted such laws or of the framers of
the fourteenth amendment. His choice was his choice, alone. His choice was rooted in
twentieth-century law's creation of the "homosexual" as the object of criminalization,
persecution, and erasure. Understood in this way, Hardwick upheld proscriptions that had
neither "ancient roots" nor sanctification by "millenia of moral teaching." The "roots" of the
Court's focus on homosexuality were, instead, the antifeminist movement and the eugenic
sexologists before World War I. The "moral teaching" of antihomosexual animus was that of
modernized natural law and theories of sexual psychopathy.
Id.
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III. Handling History: A Social Constructivist Rejoinder
My purpose in this paper is not to take issue specifically with the rather troubling
historical assertions in Bowers, nor to criticize in turn preexisting criticisms of Bowers. Rather, I
wish to burrow to a deeper methodological level to the use of history in constitutional analysis
itself. I approach my argument from a social constructivist perspective, which of course both
informs and influences my viewpoints of the use of history in constitutional analysis. This
perspective assumes that homosexuality is socially constructed in a communal sense, and,
therefore, follows in the footsteps of scholars such as Goldstein, Halley, Eskridge, Hutchinson,
223
and others, who assert that homosexuality is a recent cultural category. According to
Hutchinson, "[a] community is a social group, often geographically defined, whose members
commonly share certain experiences, world views, value systems, and cultural attributes";
community is, therefore, founded upon commonality, and "its members' relationships are
solidified by ties providing a feeling of collective identity, self-awareness, and affirmation. "
224
Communities are not mutually exclusive, but are "built into amalgamations of each other" so that
"[t]here is no essential heart or immutable center to a community." 225 Instead, communities are
kaleidoscopic, "made and remade in intricate relation to each other at every level, in a process by
which the influence of other communities penetrates not only the porous peripheral border but
also seeps up through the supposedly solid communal floor." 226 This paper's basic premise,
however, is more expansive than merely retracing the history of homosexuality to demonstrate
Bowers' flimsy historical assertions. Instead, I find fault with analyses which reach far back in
time, and would contend that beyond a certain point in time a historical perspective is largely
useless when proffered as a bolster for legal argumentation.
A historical retelling of a group's identity is as socially constructed as the group identity
itself, particularly as a history often purports to explicate or actually constitute a group's identity.
Such an analysis is influenced by current perceptions of historical players, as well as the socio-
cultural orientations of those who are enunciating the historical sagas. In order to effectively
engage in social construction, we must possess some phenomenological awareness of the
categories we are explicating; they must on some level be part of our lived experience. The
social construction of history is not exception; in order to effectively come to terms with
historical categories, these categories and the ideologies that inform them must not be alien to
our cultural senses but must somehow resonate with our past experiences or heritage. Some
historical periods are so alien to us, either from passage of time or from lack of preserved
historical accounts, that either we must acknowledge our own inability to effectively access the
social construction of these historical categories or we must engage in academic fraud, passing
our perceptions off as genuine antiques when they are but modem perspectives in antique guise.
Engaging in social construction when the time periods we seek to access gives way too easily to
manipulation and confusion of fact and affect and so cannot be trusted. Therefore, I urge that we
223 Darren Lenard Hutchinson, "Closet Case ": Boy Scouts ofAmerica v. Dale and the Reinforcement of Gay,
Lesbian, Bisexual, and Transgender Invisibility, 76 TUL. L. REV. 81, 110-11 (2001).
224 Ian F. Haney Lopez, The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations on Illusion, Fabrication, and Choice,
29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 54 (1994).
225 Id. at 59.
226 Id.
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abandon historiography all together in legal analyses of homosexual identity when it is used to
reconnect with cultures with which (in reality) it is impossible to connect.
I start from Justice Harlan's assertion in Poe v. Ullman227 that history is a living entity.
While fossils of past epochs do grace present-day culture, it is now impossible to form concrete
conclusions about homosexuality in many of these historical eras simply because the pertinent
sources of the time no longer exist. How can we assume that the Lex Scatinia forbade same-sex
acts when we must piece together what the Lex Scatinia said from literature from the time,
including satirical writings? I concede that historical inquiry for its own sake has much to offer,
and that such research efforts are invaluable. However, how can we make informed and accurate
legal conclusions on the basis of a history about which we remain largely ignorant?
With respect to investigations of homosexual history, legal scholars are just as out of
touch with some epochs of history as the Bowers majority. That at best tenuous conclusions can
be drawn about homosexual status from Rome to the late Renaissance is amply demonstrated by
the language of the brief historical summary embodied in Part I of this analysis.
The stability of historiography does not improve with time; rather, in investigating
homosexuality through legislation prohibiting same-sex relations, we lose sight of homosexuality
altogether, focusing instead on specific acts such as sodomy and thereby conflating legal status
with social identity. We succeed only in confusing legal regulation and prosecution records,
signs of authoritarian disapproval of homosexuality or same-sex relations, with social
disapproval of homosexuals as a class of persons. An explication of homosexual identity and its
role in constitutional legal analysis illuminates the problems of such a historiographical
approach. Such an explication assumes that historical investigations of a socially constructed
group such as homosexuals necessitate interpretations of group identity, for historical studies are
themselves studies of identity construction and past reactions to identity constructions.
Therefore, historiographers of homosexuality inquire into homosexual history through the lens of
homosexual identity, as constructed and interpreted in different communal levels of city, state,
and nation. The bridge between homosexuality as a socially-constructed category and
homosexual identity has been made in the context of race and racial identity by Lopez.228 Of
course, homosexuality is closely identified with communities, and communities are similarly tied
to identities; one need only recall the religious and social animus which has informed popular
constructions of homosexuality as a perverse or immoral practice. Homosexuality is constructed
by and acquires meaning in a community, and these constructions further inform homosexual
identity.
In the past, then, homosexual identity was constructed and interpreted by communities
just as it is in the present. Investigating the history of homosexuals through legislation and
prosecution records, while informative, lends the perception that only certain authoritative
227 Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("The balance of which I speak is the balance
struck by this country, having regard to what history teaches are the traditions from which it developed as well as the
traditions from which it broke. That tradition is a living thing.").
228 Lopez, supra note 224, at 57. ("Thus, membership in a community powerfully shapes personal identity. If race
is closely linked to communities and communities similarly tied to identities, then race and identity are themselves
connected.")
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communities are connected to homosexuality and inform homosexual identity-that homosexual
identity is externally imposed by authorities through legal and other means. This at best
undervalues and at worse ignores the contributions of other communities. Such an analysis not
only ignores the fact that other communities are connected to homosexuality and construct and
inform homosexual identity, but it also suggests that homosexuals themselves do not construct
and inform their own group identities, and by implication, that they are not a group. However,
homosexuals emerged as a group when they came together into communities, at whatever
historical point that occurred. Thus, legal prohibitions of sodomy and other same-sex acts do not
define a class of people known as homosexuals, but merely distinguish acts which were
prohibited behaviors; if categories were created, they were of the 'sodomite' and not of the
'homosexual' variety. Such external constructions of homosexuality which only examine the
sense-making contributions of certain communities are thus illusory because homosexuality is
socially constructed by all communities, being "closely tied to the construction of personal
identities and communities. '" 229 Homosexuality is "not just an external definition of group
membership, but a source of social identity," and so connections between homosexuality,
"community ties, and personal identity illustrate how what we look like [or who we are attracted
to] often says something important about who we are." 230  Therefore, homosexuality is an
informal definition of membership as well. The enunciation of homosexuality as a social
category had communal implications; like members of the Native American, Mexican, and
California Chinese populations, homosexuals (and heterosexuals) lived as members of other
communities before "elements of their morphology became racially [and sexually]
meaningful., 231 After the categories of homosexuality and heterosexuality were conceived and
constructed, however, people were divided into different communities because their sexual
attractions acquired new communal meaning, and their sexual attractions defined the boundaries
of these new, narrower communities.
If researchers are not somehow part of the constructive community, then they cannot
readily come to terms with the identities of the groups in that community, and the reasons and
processes by which the groups are constructed as they are. Furthermore, because communities
are not mutually exclusive and are perpetually in flux, researchers must be able to access
historical communities in order to ascertain the ways in which they overlap. Lopez asserts that
"the community ties we honor as individuals are themselves volatile, changing not only over
time but also depending on the setting. 232 This then, underscores the importance of context;
"[c]ontext is everything" for the historiographer. 233 In order to be conversant with context, one
must know how "questions of community and identity change in response to other questions,"
234
such as "Compared to what? As of when? Who is asking? In what context? For what
purpose?
235
229Id. at 54.
230 Id.
231 Id..
232Id. at 60.
233 Nan D. Hunter, Expressive Identity: Recuperating Dissentfor Equality, 35 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1, 15
(2000).
234 Lopez, supra note 224, at 60.
235 Id. at 60 (citing Barbara Johnson, Thresholds of Difference: Structures ofAddress in Zora Neale Hurston, in
"RACE," WRITING, AND DIFFERENCE 322, 323 (Henry Louis Gates, Jr., ed., 1986)).
Summer 2004
Richmond Journal of Law and the Public Interest
Historiographers must take special care in describing the historical communities that
provided the interpretive context for constructions of group identity lest they overemphasize the
role of a particular group instead of the larger communal context which informs that group. Like
"racial fabrication," analyzing history in terms of heterosexuality and homosexuality
fundamentally "changes communities by emphasizing or even creating commonalities while
eroding previously relevant differences. '" 236  The "construction of certain morphological
features" as socially meaningful and the resultant social mediation of identity "serve[s] to shape
communities by providing a common experience to people who earlier or in a different context
may not have seen themselves as similar."237 Thus, the unwary historiographer may dispense
sagas of communal experiences, perceptions of homosexuality, and constructions of homosexual
identity that simply did not exist. Such erroneous attribution is an especially easy mistake to
make as the social realities of a category, when emphasized over other categories, can
overwhelm other areas of difference-therefore, historical interpretation is, for better or for
worse, a means of uniting and dividing, of drawing different borders and creating new ones.
238
Fortunately, it is has become overwhelmingly simpler to analyze those constructions of
homosexual identity which have emerged in recent years, for communities are now more
resilient than in the past. Because of "technological transformations and communication
revolutions, communities increasingly ... remain intact and culturally meaningful even when
their members are physically dispersed., 239 A community that is culturally meaningful is one
whose cultural meanings are still accessible, whether the community exists in the present or in
the past.
Clearly, then, one must "know" an identity and a community to ascertain how elements
of identity interact; only then can one see how an identity category "aligns with a system of
social stratification that inscribes it as identity. 240 One also needs to access history to ascertain
an identity's social standing and alignment; "[o]ne's identity ... is based not on an individual's
self-perception of the salience of certain characteristics, but on the centrality of those
characteristics to her standing and treatment in society." 241 In a historical analysis that is
uninformed, communal and individual identities become separated when they never should be;
"identity at the level of the individual and identity at the level of the community are only
analytically distinct. In our lived experience, ...they are continuous and reciprocal.'
242
Finally, without a lived experience of history, a researcher is not only ignorant of identity and its
constructions but also of the politics of identity and the processes which inform them. According
to Hunter, "'identity politics' captures the moment of recognition of, and reaction against, a
system of exclusion," and "[r]ecognizing exclusion, one's place, and one's community's place in
that discursive system ... is the experience from which identity and identity politics emerge."
243
Being able to somehow experience the emergence of identity and identity politics is crucial, for
236Id. at 55.
237 id.
238 See Id. at 56. As Lopez asserts, "[t]he social reality of race and racism to some extent overwhelms the
differences dividing professional, blue collar, evangelical, Episcopal, Northern, Southem, urban, and rural Blacks."
Id.23 9 id.
240 Hunter, supra note 233, at 5.
241 Id
242 Id. at6.
243 Id. at 7.
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this genesis marks the "moment of affiliation, of realization of exclusion" and therefore "is a
(perhaps the) moment of identity formation. It is the moment when identity's social meaning
becomes manifest to the individual in a matrix of community."
244
In summary, an accessible social identity, together with its communal context, is one that
is "active and expressive, rather than static and clinical. 245 When researchers analyze identities
and communities that are outside of their lived experience, history becomes one-dimensional
instead of the multidimensional, "living" history that Harlan speaks of in Poe. When history is
one-dimensional, it is a shadow of its former social self; a historical analysis that is not informed
by lived experience cannot effectively explicate identity but can only conjure up its ghost. Such
one-sided explications, if conclusory, can be a way of escaping from the complexities of a
multidimensional historical analysis of identity, and are merely entertaining, not respectable
contributions to legal scholarship. It is so easy to lend illusory dimensions to historical shadows.
It is then child's play to manipulate history like a marionette, prompting it to dance here to
vindicate contemporary homosexual animus, tickling it to dance there to infer a history of social
marginalization on the basis of legal regulation.
At this point, it is essential to note that a group does not have one identity, or one set of
identity politics. Homosexuality has not had only one existence; it has not been restricted to one
enunciation. Instead, it has had and continues to have a plurality of existences and enunciations.
These various existences and enunciations are related, but are historically and geographically
unique, discrete in both time and space. To know one enunciation is to know just that one, and
not to know all. Moreover, each identity's existence has its own enunciation or expression that
validates its social existence at a particular point in time. Such an expression is necessary to
confirm the identity, and is, therefore, representative of that identity; "[i]dentities, once formed,
require expression to exist," and the "representation or expression of identity is necessary for that
identity to have a social existence." 246  Such expressions make identity performative, and
consequently, identities and expressions are not "preordained by nature but [are themselves]
generated and sustained by a matrix of cultural mechanisms, a matrix that allows the
performance to be read and understood., 247 Once again, if these matrixes are not accessible to
researchers, then identities and their expressions, even though they are performative and
therefore visible, cannot be understood in their proper historical context.
In essence, then, such a proper historical context no longer exists in many epochs for
historical analyses of homosexuality. It is for this reason that I am restricting my critique of
historiography as a methodology to homosexuality, instead of extending it to race and gender as
well. Every nation has cultural narratives which resound in the lived experiences of its citizens.
These narratives keep alive the histories of certain social groups. In America, our cultural
narratives resound with the history of African Americans and women. Our cultural narratives do
not resound with the history of homosexuals. Thus, the histories of African Americans and
women are part of our lived experience as imbibers of American culture, and are accessible in
ways that the history of homosexuals is not. This is not necessarily a sign of a conscious cultural
244 id
245 Hutchinson, supra note 223, at 86.
246 Hunter, supra note 233, at 9.
247Id. at 9-10.
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refusal to preserve narratives of homosexual history; I would posit that the history of
homosexuals is a recent history in America, beginning at any one of several points in the
twentieth century, perhaps around the 1930s and 1940s with the hysterical characterization of
homosexuality as a perversion, perhaps around the 1960s when Stonewall took place.
Homosexuality as a history may start at one point for straight people, at another point for gay
people, and at yet another point for lesbians, or it could be unique to an individual instead of to a
group. I cannot pretend to determine at what point a history of homosexuality begins to be
enunciated. I will, however, posit that homosexuality is not a recent historical evolution, but that
the consciousness of a homosexual history is. In other words, to rewind homosexual history to
the days of Rome or to place it within the context of a twelfth-century penitential is to take
homosexuality out of its communal context, to place it in an identity shaped by straight people, a
heteronormative history that homosexuals cannot and most likely do not want to appropriate.
We have already seen to some extent that improper historiography confuses legal status
with identity. Such a historiography also conflates moral status with identity, and confuses the
secular prohibition of same-sex acts with religious prohibition. All of these conflations stem
from the erroneous presentation of identity as continuous over time, which in turn stems from a
failure to see homosexual identity in a discretely communal, socially-constructed manner. It is
obviously an overgeneralization to believe that a penance always reflected a certain level of
social disapprobation for same-sex activity. However, even the assumption that the assignment
of a harsh penance for sodomy reflected the level of ecclesiastical disapproval of that act is
overbroad, for penances were allocated according to the discretion of the ecclesiastical official
administering the penance, and were not hard and fast sentences for sin. This truth invokes once
again the importance of identity and its communal context. It is also possible to use communal
theories of identity construction to explain why ineffective historiography conflates secular and
religious prohibitions of same-sex acts. The state and the church have nearly always been
distinct communities, overlapping at times, but remaining largely separate with the exception of
historical periods when various, rulers such as Henry VIII of England, assumed the
responsibilities attendant upon a religious head of state, formerly the Pope, as well as those
attendant upon a secular prince. Even in such circumstances, the Roman Catholic Church always
longed to reassert its own authority by deposing such secular rulers as religious figureheads and
returning erring nations to its Christian flock. Those uninformed of this historical distinction
between the secular and religious communities find it easy to conflate ecclesiastical penance
with statutory punishment because they fail to realize that the Church, a discrete community, had
authority in spiritual spheres which, for a time, the state, another discrete community, had no
interest in usurping. The identity of homosexuality was constructed differently within the
ecclesiastical community than it was in the secular community; and even when the two merged
ecclesiastical prosecution with secular punishment in the Inquisition, each discrete community
played a distinct role and inhabited a unique sphere of authority. Moreover, in the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries, when secular governments revised sodomy laws by including
somewhat religious references to 'unnatural acts' and 'crimes against nature," such revisions
were dictated not by theologic rationales but by the secular community's perceived need to
correct problems that arose in the context of prosecuting same-sex acts (namely, phrasing same-
sex acts as "unnatural" allowed the provisions criminalizing such acts to be broadly construed).
Viewing prosecution and punishment in terms of a communal construction of homosexuality
inherently undermines historiographic tendencies to simplify analyses by representing history as
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a smooth continuum instead of a series of pinpricks that converge upon an action at a particular
time in history. Communities, as discrete spatial units with discrete histories of their own,
produce discrete constructions of homosexuality, so that a continuum model has no place in a
homosexual historiography.
IV. Lawrence v. Texas
Lawrence v. Texas 48 assumes a place in the pantheon of privacy jurisprudence as a literal
"benchmark" enunciating limitations on a State's right to constrain individual behaviors. 24' This
section will explicate how the individualized focus and conduct-centered conclusions which are
the hallmarks of the privacy rights vehicle bar the effective enunciation of the type of
communally-focused legal principle which is essential to the acknowledgment of a homosexual
identity.
Under the facts of Lawrence, a reported weapons disturbance brought Harris County,
Texas police officers to the Houston apartment of John Geddes Lawrence. 250 When officers
entered the apartment, they found Mr. Lawrence "engaging in a sexual act" with another man,
Mr. Tyron Garner. 51 Both men were arrested and held overnight, then charged and convicted
for "deviate sexual intercourse, namely anal sex, with a member of the same sex." 252 Lawrence
and Garner sought to challenge the statute under which they were convicted253 on Equal
Protection grounds in Harris County Criminal Court, but were unsuccessful; both men were fined
$200 and assessed court costs. 2 54 The Court of Appeals for Texas likewise rejected this claim,
after which petitioners appealed to the United States Supreme Court, which granted certiorari.
The Majority Opinion
A fundamental rights analysis invariably focuses on individual rights and not group
identity, thus pushing homosexuality itself in the background while foregrounding same-sex
intimate behaviors. Justice Kennedy locates this particular right, as expected, in the
individual. 255  The right in question-to engage in intimate same-sex relations, inherently
broader than the individual-is not extended beyond the intimate couple.25 6 Even references to
homosexuality modify the noun "person."
257
248 Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003).
249 Thus, this case comes from the same tradition as Griswoldv. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), andRoe v. Wade 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
250 123 S. Ct. at 2475.
251 Id. at 2475-76.
252 Id. at 2476.
253 Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 21.06(a) (2003).
254 123 S. Ct. at 2476.
255 As Justice Kennedy states, "[t]he statutes do seek to control a personal relationship that, whether or not entitled
to formal recognition in the law, is within the liberty of persons to choose without being punished as criminals." Id.
at 2478 (emphasis added).
256 In the words of Justice Kennedy,
It suffices for us to acknowledge that adults may choose to enter upon this relationship in the
confines of their homes and their own private lives and still retain their dignity as free
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In order to overcome the curse of the Bowers tomb, Justice Kennedy, the knight errant,
must thwart both the crafty specter of historical construction and answer the riddle of the ghost
of moral precedent. The Justice first confronts the specter of the so-called "ancient roots" that
haunted criticisms of Bowers for years. Initially, Justice Kennedy neatly sidesteps the apparition
by stating that the Bowers court "misapprehended the claim of liberty there presented to it" by
"stating the claim to be whether there is a fundamental right to engage in consensual sodomy." 258
He then notes the many criticisms of Bowers and concludes, "we need not enter this debate in the
attempt to reach a definitive historical judgment," only to qualify that assertion with one
reservation: "the following considerations counsel against adopting the definitive conclusions
upon which Bowers placed such reliance."
259
Justice Kennedy's method of exorcising the ghost of Bowers' "ancient roots" argument is
to engage its historical presumptions on their own terms-countering historical fiction with
apparent historical fact to set the record on homosexual history straight. The majority opinion
builds its historical foundations on the very same contested territory on which critics have
previously fought messy battles over matters of historical accuracy. Justice Kennedy, for
instance, bases his assertions on scholars' conclusions that "there is no longstanding history in
this country of laws directed at homosexual conduct as a distinct matter." 260 Thus, the majority
opinion wades into the same mire in which critics of Bowers have been floundering about for
years.
It is at this juncture that the limitations of a privacy rights analysis become fully apparent.
At the outset, Justice Kennedy grounds himself on the strong earth of textual analyses of early
American anti-sodomy legislation, as interpreted by jurists of the times. 26 1 Such a discussion,
while infinitely more substantial than Bowers' historical quicksand, conflates conduct with group
status and constructed identity. References to "homosexual conduct" abound, rendering one-
dimensional those who participate in such conduct, and casting entirely into darkness the group
whose members may or may not see sexual conduct as a defining characteristic of their group
identity. Justice Kennedy does note the connection between conduct and social category when
he states that the "absence of legal prohibitions focusing on homosexual conduct may be
explained in part by noting that according to some scholars the concept of the homosexual as a
distinct category of person did not emerge until the late 19th century. 262 However, his next
statement extinguishes any potential exhibited by that brief sentence by returning once more to
"homosexual conduct.,
263
persons. When sexuality finds overt expression in intimate conduct with another person, the
conduct can be but one element in a personal bond that is more enduring.
Id.
257 For instance, Kennedy's assertion that "[t]he liberty protected by the Constitution allows homosexual persons the
right to make this choice." Id. (emphasis added).
258 Id.
2 5 9 
id.
260 id.
261 See id (referring to King v. Wiseman, 92 Eng. Rep. 774 (K.B. 1718), and "nineteenth century commentators"
who interpret such legislation).
262Id at 2478-79.
263 As Justice Kennedy states,
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After this, the journey is an easy, smooth journey of logic aboard the privacy doctrine to
the end of the junction and its happy, but still limited, conclusion. Discussions of anti-sodomy
laws give way to accounts of their infrequent enforcement, which is in turn explained away by a
rather shallow assertion once again centered entirely in the context of conduct:
In all events that infrequency makes it difficult to say that society approved of a
rigorous and systematic punishment of the consensual acts committed in private
and by adults. The longstanding criminal prohibition of homosexual sodomy
upon which the Bowers decision placed such reliance is as consistent with a
general condemnation of nonprocreative sex as it is with an established tradition
of prosecuting acts because of their homosexual character.
264
Thus, it is societal disapproval of homosexual conduct that is at issue, not societal disapproval of
homosexuals themselves as a group. Infrequent prosecutions for "homosexual conduct" are
divorced from the inevitable societal animus and instead attributed to the "very private" nature of
the conduct itself.265 Public attention to such conduct and the ensuing tides of indignation and
vindication only swept away those practitioners who were visible; the public eye could not attack
those engaging in same-sex intimacies literally undercover-driven out of sight by the very same
moral opinions and persecution which engendered anti-sodomy legislation.
With the majority opinion firmly centered in the private context of individual conduct
and sanitized by an appropriately bounded description of such behaviors, Justice Kennedy sums
up the Bowers debacle with the following lukewarm catch-all: "In summary, the historical
grounds relied upon in Bowers are more complex than the majority opinion and the concurring
opinion by Chief Justice Burger indicate. Their historical premises are not without doubt and, at
the very least, are overstated. 266 With these words, Justice Kennedy spins the prior historical
analysis into a justification to depart from Bowers' precedent. This is the keystone of the
majority opinion in which Justice Kennedy could have enunciated a communal basis for the
ruling rooted in group identity by explaining how societal animus towards homosexuals
themselves had abated in recent years. Again, however, Justice Kennedy's choice of a privacy
rights vehicle dictates the outcome, compelling him to comment not upon any reduction in
societal animus towards homosexuals, but to leap past that logical assertion to describe a
reduction in societal animus towards homosexual conduct that is somehow devoid of any
accompanying decrease in antipathy towards homosexuals. 267 His employment of an analysis of
Thus early American sodomy laws were not directed at homosexuals as such but instead
sought to prohibit nonprocreative sexual activity more generally. This does not suggest
approval of homosexual conduct. It does tend to show that this particular form of conduct was
not thought of as a separate category from like conduct between heterosexual persons.
Id. at 2479.
264 Id.
265 id
266Id at 2480.
267 As Justice Kennedy writes,
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national and international legal treatment of homosexual conduct only rebuilds the closet around
homosexuals as a group. It is at this point in the opinion that the devastating privacy rights
anchor of the opinion hooks itself. Relying on a quote from Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,26 8 Kennedy describes the homosexual conduct in question
in the following manner:
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may
make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are
central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of
liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the
universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could
not define the attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of
the State.269
The only portion of the majority opinion which is centered in a communal context is a
brief but significant statement linking conduct homosexual conduct and group identity:
When homosexual conduct is made criminal by the law of the State, that
declaration in and of itself is an invitation to subject homosexual persons to
discrimination both in the public and in the private spheres. The central
holding of Bowers has been brought in question by this case, and it should be
addressed. Its continuance as precedent demeans the lives of homosexual
270persons.
Once again, however, the impact of this assertion is defeated from the ensuing context of this
remark. Justice Kennedy emphasizes that homosexual persons would be demeaned by a criminal
sodomy conviction-just as any other person convicted of a sex offense requiring registration
would be demeaned. 271 Thus, the harm still accrues to the individual's identity, and not that of
the group. Ultimately, then, though Justice Kennedy recognizes that the "values we share with a
Chief Justice Burger joined the opinion for the Court in Bowers and further explained his
views as follows: "Decisions of individuals relating to homosexual conduct have been subject
to state intervention throughout the history of Western civilization. Condemnation of those
practices is firmly rooted in Judeao-Christian moral and ethical standards." 478 U.S., at 196,
106 S.Ct. 2841. As with Justice White's assumptions about history, scholarship casts some
doubt on the sweeping nature of the statement by Chief Justice Burger as it pertains to private
homosexual conduct between consenting adults. See, e.g., Eskridge, Hardwick and
Historiography, 1999 U. Ill. L.Rev. 631, 656. In all events we think that our laws and
traditions in the past half century are of most relevance here. These references show an
emerging awareness that liberty gives substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how
to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex.
Id.
268 505 U.S. 833 (1992)
269 123 S. Ct. at 2481 (citing Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 851).
270 123 S. Ct. at 2482.
271 As Kennedy states, "[w]e are advised that if Texas convicted an adult for private, consensual homosexual
conduct under the statute here in question the convicted person would come within the registration laws of a least
four States were he or she to be subject to their jurisdiction." Id.
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wider civilization" 272 compel the recognition of a right for persons to engage in private same-sex
relations, these values do not likewise render necessary a corresponding acknowledgment of the
legitimacy of homosexuals as a group, effectively rendering the term "homosexual" an "H-
bomb" with potential for legal devastation and societal consternation. This rebuilt closet is a
large and very dark one, for as Justice Kennedy comments, the holding of Lawrence "does not
involve public conduct or prostitution. It does not involve whether the government must give
formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter."273 Once can still
only come out in private, and then only in the company of one other. It remains for another court
to open the door to wider recognition.
The Concurrence of Justice O'Connor
Justice O'Connor's concurrence rejects a privacy rights analysis in favor of the inherent
communal focus of Equal Rights.274 O'Connor quickly identifies the brand of constitutional
scrutiny to be applied: a heightened rational basis standard, which has been used to overturn
illegitimate state interests such as "a bare ... desire to harm a politically unpopular group."275 The
potential of this "more searching form of rational basis," to acknowledge the existence of a
communal homosexual identity, turns out to be applied only to a law that "inhibits personal
relationships. 276  All is not without hope, however, for when held up to the magic Equal
Protection mirror, the personal relationships of homosexuals as a class are treated differently
from those the personal relationships of heterosexuals as a class.277 O'Connor thus finally (like
Justice Kennedy) makes that crucial link between criminalized conduct and social status, on a
much more explicit and deeper level:
And the effect of Texas' sodomy law is not just limited to the threat of
prosecution or consequence of conviction. Texas' sodomy law brands all
homosexuals as criminals, thereby making it more difficult for homosexuals
to be treated in the same manner as everyone else. Indeed, Texas itself has
previously acknowledged the collateral effects of the law, stipulating in a
prior challenge to this action that the law "legally sanctions discrimination
272 Id. at 2483 ("To the extent Bowers relied on values we share with a wider civilization, it should be noted that the
reasoning and holding in Bowers have been rejected elsewhere.").
273 Id. at 2484.
274 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Rather than relying on the substantive component of the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause, as the Court does, I base my conclusion on the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal
Protection Clause.").
275 Id. at 2485 (citing Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)).
276 Id. at 2485.
277 As Justice O'Connor states,
The statute at issue here makes sodomy a crime only if a person "engages in deviate sexual
intercourse with another individual of the same sex." Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 21.06(a) (2003).
Sodomy between opposite-sex partners, however, is not a crime in Texas. That is, Texas treats
the same conduct differently based solely on the participants. Those harmed by this law are
people who have a same-sex sexual orientation and thus are more likely to engage in behavior
prohibited by § 21.06.
Id.
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against [homosexuals] in a variety of ways unrelated to the criminal law,"
including in the areas of "employment, family issues, and housing."
278
Justice O'Connor's Equal Protection analysis also evades the trap of conflating sodomy
with homosexuality by explicitly contextualizing it as an activity that can be engaged in by two
groups. 279 Kennedy's earlier historical analysis merely hinted at this principle, but without such
an explicit communal context. It is Justice O'Connor's analysis of homosexuals as a class,
however, that is the true heart of her concurrence. Justice O'Connor grounds her discussion in
the assertion that "[m]oral disapproval of a group cannot be a legitimate governmental interest
under the Equal Protection Clause because legal classifications must not be 'drawn for the
purpose of disadvantaging the group burdened by the law."' 280  She then explicitly couples
societal animus towards homosexuals with anti-sodomy legislation by expressly equating
disapproval of homosexual conduct with disapproval of homosexuals as a group.281 Not only
does the law function to perpetuate such animus, but the law itself is more effective as a tool of
that animus: "because Texas so rarely enforces its sodomy law as applied to private, consensual
acts, the law serves more as a statement of dislike and disapproval against homosexuals than as a
tool to stop criminal behavior., 282  This explication delves much deeper than does Justice
Kennedy's assertion that infrequent sodomy prosecutions resulted from the private nature of the
intimate conduct. In forging a closer connection, Justice O'Connor describes the legal treatment
of "homosexual" in the defamation category of slander per se to emphasize the twisted logic of
Texas's rationale; in effect, the state admits that "being homosexual carries the presumption of
being a criminal. 283
278 State v. Morales, 826 S.W.2d 201, 203 (Tex. App. 1992).
279 See, for instance, Justice O'Connor's language in the following assertion: "Bowers did not hold that moral
disapproval of a group is a rational basis under the Equal Protection Clause to criminalize homosexual sodomy when
heterosexual sodomy is not punished." Id. at* 16.280 Id. (citing Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996)).
21 As she states,
Texas argues, however, that the sodomy law does not discriminate against homosexual
persons. Instead, the State maintains that the law discriminates only against homosexual
conduct. While it is true that the law applies only to conduct, the conduct targeted by this law
is conduct that is closely correlated with being homosexual. Under such circumstances, Texas'
sodomy law is targeted at more than conduct. It is instead directed toward gay persons as a
class. "After all, there can hardly be more palpable discrimination against a class than making
the conduct that defines the class criminal." Id., at 641.... When a State makes homosexual
conduct criminal, and not "deviate sexual intercourse" committed by persons of different
sexes, "that declaration in and of itself is an invitation to subject homosexual persons to
discrimination both in the public and in the private spheres."
Id. (citing Romer, 517 U.S. at 641).282 123 S. Ct. at 2486.
283 Id at 2487. The entire context of this statement is as follows:
Indeed, Texas law confirms that the sodomy statute is directed toward homosexuals as a class.
In Texas, calling a person a homosexual is slander per se because the word "homosexual"
"impute[s] the commission of a crime." Plumley v. Landmark Chevrolet, Inc., 122 F.3d 308,
310 (C.A.5 1997) (applying Texas law); see also Heady. Newton, 596 S.W.2d 209,210
(Tex.App. 1980). The State has admitted that because of the sodomy law, being homosexual
carries the presumption of being a criminal. See State v. Morales, 826 S.W.2d, at 202-203
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At the conclusion of her concurrence, Justice O'Connor too is careful to boundary the
language of her opinion with statements cautioning one to be wary of any assumed extensions of
her reasoning: "[t]hat this law as applied to private, consensual conduct is unconstitutional under
the Equal Protection Clause does not mean that other laws distinguishing between heterosexuals
and homosexuals would similarly fail under rational basis review.' 284  Specifically, she
emphasizes national security and the marital institution as other interests which, if asserted, are
presumptively "legitimate enough" to buoy up anti-homosexual legislation.285  Ultimately,
Justice O'Connor's rebuilt closet is situated within a more communal context, her reasoning, like
Kennedy's, affirms that homosexuals as a group may still be isolated and ostracized because of
their conduct outside of a private space, forcing homosexuals once more into the darkness.
Justice Scalia's Dissent
A discussion of the treatment of homosexuals as a group in Lawrence v. Texas would be
incomplete without considering Justice Scalia's rather scathing dissent. Epitomizing the
textually conservative judicial approach, Scalia roasts Kennedy's (also conservative) assessment
that the societal attitude towards private homosexual conduct has thawed. Describing this case
as stemming from a lack of "individual or societal reliance on Bowers,"286 Justice Scalia harkens
back to "the ancient proposition that a governing majority's belief that certain sexual behavior is
'immoral and unacceptable' constitutes a rational basis for regulation." 287 Worse, his assessment
explicitly conflates laws criminalizing homosexuality with those outlawing other forms of
deviant sexual conduct, thus conflating homosexuality itself with deviance (thus conjuring up
days when homosexuality was a mental illness) and completely denying any homosexuals' claim
to a legitimate group identity:
State laws against bigamy, same-sex marriage, adult incest, prostitution,
masturbation, adultery, fornication, bestiality, and obscenity are likewise
sustainable only in light of Bowers' validation of laws based on moral choices.
Every single one of these laws is called into question by today's decision; the
Court makes no effort to cabin the scope of its decision to exclude them from
its holding .... The impossibility of distinguishing homosexuality from other
("[T]he statute brands lesbians and gay men as criminals and thereby legally sanctions
discrimination against them in a variety of ways unrelated to the criminal law"). Texas'
sodomy law therefore results in discrimination against homosexuals as a class in an array of
areas outside the criminal law. See ibid. In Romer v. Evans, we refused to sanction a law that
singled out homosexuals "for disfavored legal status." 517 U.S., at 633, 116 S.Ct. 1620. The
same is true here. The Equal Protection Clause "'neither knows nor tolerates classes among
citizens.' "Id., at 623, 116 S.Ct. 1620 (quoting Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559, 16
S.Ct. 1138, 41 L.Ed. 256 (1896) (Harlan, J. dissenting)).
Id.284 123 S. Ct. at 2487.
285 Id. at 2487-88 ("Texas cannot assert any legitimate state interest here, such as national security or preserving the
traditional institution of marriage.").
286 123 S. Ct. at 2489 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
217Id. at 2490.
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traditional "morals" offenses is precisely why Bowers rejected the rational-
basis challenge.
2 88
Decrying the majority opinion as a "massive disruption of the current social order," 289 Justice
Scalia strongly echoes the conduct-based approach of the majority's historical analysis, asserting
that it need not matter whether the sodomy act was criminal as between homosexuals or
heterosexuals-what was at issue was that sodomy itself was criminalized.29 °  Poking fun at
Justice Kennedy's speculations as to the enforcement of sodomy laws, 29 1 Justice Scalia
nonetheless relies on such an argument to strengthen his contention that the right to engage in
sodomy is not a right at all.
Justice Scalia also neatly sidesteps the Equal Protection treatment of this issue with a
smoke-and-mirrors trick of reasoning, asserting that the discrimination at issue is facially
"against men or women as a class." 292 This inherently denies homosexuals the group identity
that Justice O'Connor accords them and forecloses the possibility that homosexuals could be
seen as anything approaching a suspect class whose existence would mandate heightened
scrutiny-a logical consequence if they are constructed as sexual deviants. Justice Scalia's
diminution of homosexuality as a group identity is perhaps most strongly illustrated by his
comparison of the group to "nudists.,
293
288 Id. See also id at 2495 ("The Texas statute undeniably seeks to further the belief of its citizens that certain forms
of sexual behavior are "immoral and unacceptable," . . . the same interest furthered by criminal laws against
fornication, bigamy, adultery, adult incest, bestiality, and obscenity.") (citing Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196).2 89 Id. at *22.
290 As Justice Scalia asserts,
It is (as Bowers recognized) entirely irrelevant whether the laws in our long national tradition
criminalizing homosexual sodomy were "directed at homosexual conduct as a distinct
matter." Ante, at ---- 7. Whether homosexual sodomy was prohibited by a law targeted at
same-sex sexual relations or by a more general law prohibiting both homosexual and
heterosexual sodomy, the only relevant point is that it was criminalized ....
Id. at *25.
291 As Justice Scalia explains,
The key qualifier here is "acting in private"--since the Court admits that sodomy laws were
enforced against consenting adults (although the Court contends that prosecutions were
"infrequent," ante, at ---- 9). I do not know what "acting in private" means; surely consensual
sodomy, like heterosexual intercourse, is rarely performed on stage. If all the Court means by
"acting in private" is "on private premises, with the doors closed and windows covered," it is
entirely unsurprising that evidence of enforcement would be hard to come by. (Imagine the
circumstances that would enable a search warrant to be obtained for a residence on the ground
that there was probable cause to believe that consensual sodomy was then and there
occurring.)
Id. at *25.
292 Id. at 2495.
293 Addressing the claim that the Texas anti-sodomy statute is targeted towards homosexuals as a group, Scalia
counters, "Of course the same could be said of any law. A law against public nudity targets 'the conduct that is
closely correlated with being a nudist,' and hence 'is targeted at more than conduct'; it is 'directed toward nudists as
a class."' Id. at 2496.
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Effectively on fire by the middle of the fifth segment of his dissent, Justice Scalia finally
ignites the barricade of cultural arguments that the majority opinion and Justice O'Connor have
erected to dismantle the Bowers precedent. Proclaiming the onslaught of a "homosexual
agenda," 294 Scalia gloomily protests that "the Court has taken sides in the culture war, departing
from its role of assuring, as neutral observer," turning a deaf ear to the "many" homophobic
Americans who "do not want persons who openly engage in homosexual conduct as partners in
their business, as scoutmasters for their children, as teachers in their children's schools, or as
boarders in their home." 295 He then denies that any national accord on a positive construction of
homosexual identity exists, equating the cultural attitudes of a pluralist culture with the actions
of elected legislators. 296  Justice Scalia denies harboring any personal animosity towards
homosexuals, 297 but nonetheless implies that the advocacy of the "homosexual agenda" has by
some grassroots miracle manipulated the democratic process to gain a sufficient foothold to dupe
six Supreme Court Justices into finding a privacy right where none should rightly exist. As he
phrases it, "persuading one's fellow citizens is one thing, and imposing one's views in absence of
democratic majority will is something else." 298  Ultimately, a controversial agenda that
successfully quests for judicial change is full of diabolical potential. For Scalia, the
consequences of such tyranny-which acknowledges the existence of positive constructions of
homosexual identity-are unthinkable.
299
294 Id. ("Today's opinion is the product of a Court, which is the product of a law-profession culture, that has largely
signed on to the so-called homosexual agenda, by which I mean the agenda promoted by some homosexual activists
directed at eliminating the moral opprobrium that has traditionally attached to homosexual conduct.").
295 Id. at 2497.
296 As Justice Scalia states,
So imbued is the Court with the law profession's anti-anti-homosexual culture, that it is
seemingly unaware that the attitudes of that culture are not obviously "mainstream"; that in
most States what the Court calls "discrimination" against those who engage in homosexual
acts is perfectly legal; that proposals to ban such "discrimination" under Title VII have
repeatedly been rejected by Congress, see Employment Non- Discrimination Act of 1994, S.
2238, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994); Civil Rights Amendments, H.R. 5452, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1975); that in some cases such "discrimination" is mandatedby federal statute, see 10
U.S.C. § 654(b)(1) (mandating discharge from the armed forces of any service member who
engages in or intends to engage in homosexual acts); and that in some cases such
"discrimination" is a constitutional right, see Boy Scouts ofAmerica v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640,
120 S.Ct. 2446, 147 L.Ed.2d 554 (2000).
Id. at 2497.297 Id. ("Let me be clear that I have nothing against homosexuals, or any other group, promoting their agenda
through normal democratic means.").
298 Id.
299 As Justice Scalia remarks,
Today's opinion dismantles the structure of constitutional law that has permitted a distinction
to be made between heterosexual and homosexual unions, insofar as formal recognition in
marriage is concerned. If moral disapprobation of homosexual conduct is "no legitimate state
interest" for purposes of proscribing that conduct, ante, at ---- 18; and if, as the Court coos
(casting aside all pretense of neutrality), "[w]hen sexuality finds overt expression in intimate
conduct with another person, the conduct can be but one element in a personal bond that is
more enduring," ante, at ---- 6; what justification could there possibly be for denying the
benefits of marriage to homosexual couples exercising "[t]he liberty protected by the
Constitution," ibid.? Surely not the encouragement of procreation, since the sterile and the
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V. Conclusion: We're not in Rome, so Don't Do What the Romans Did
Historiography is most effective when it confines itself to history which is part of lived
experience instead of free ranging over ten centuries of Western heritage. Some historiographers
who relish the freedom to explore the unascertainable depths of centuries upon centuries of
history might resent being 'tied' to the comparatively recent past. Others might inquire how
historiography will acquire the historical authority that currently appears to resonate within its
bounds. Any historical authority lent by discussions of ancient Roman legislation, medieval
penances, or Enlightenment invocations of Socratic homoeroticism is purely illusory; these
epochs are now static times, documented only through isolated diaries or prescribed
punishments. We can no longer access these communities, and therefore cannot realistically
assess their homosexual constructions. While we may not be able to access these constructions
for interpretive purposes, nothing prevents us from accessing them for reporting purposes. Only
conclusions based upon these constructions invokes the possibility of grievous error.
Instead, one should question why historical communities which are no longer a part of
our lived experience should inform contemporary constructions of homosexuality at all. This is
a query that many courts have consistently dodged. The weight of homosexual animus grows
considerably lighter when the shadows of misconstrued historical constructions are thrown off.
The glory of Rome belongs to Rome and must be left to Rome, not carried forth to the present
day. Rome's glory was founded by a civilization that thrived when it absorbed the religious and
social constructions of other civilizations' cultures that were within its lived experience, such as
those of ancient Greece. Rome fell when it became divided and inflexible, unable to adapt to
alternative cultural constructions. If we learn any lesson from Rome, it should be by this
analogy. In our own lived experience, homosexuality is not an unnatural practice but a symptom
of a far more threatening phenomenon: diversity.
elderly are allowed to marry. This case "does not involve" the issue of homosexual marriage
only if one entertains the belief that principle and logic have nothing to do with the decisions
of this Court. Many will hope that, as the Court comfortingly assures us, this is so.
Id. at 2498.
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